Wasatch Equality v. Alta Ski Lifts Co., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 7033

Alta Ski Area is a private company operating a ski resort on ~2,130 acres, ~1,800 acres of which are National Forest Service (NFS) land under a Forest Service Ski Area Term Special Use Permit.
Under the permit the Forest Service annually reviews and approves Alta’s winter site operation plan (which authorizes Alta to exclude certain "skiing devices") and receives a usage fee (roughly $300k–$470k/year).
Alta enforces a long-standing ban on snowboarding and markets itself as a “skiers’ mountain”; plaintiffs are snowboarders who wish to snowboard at Alta.
Wasatch Equality sued, alleging the snowboard ban is discriminatory and violates equal protection as applied to the federal government (Fifth Amendment via Fourteenth Amendment principles), and argued the ban is attributable to the Forest Service (state action).
The district court dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to plausibly plead state action; the Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding the pleaded facts did not make Alta’s ban fairly attributable to the United States.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Alta’s snowboard ban qualifies as state action so as to trigger constitutional equal protection review	Wasatch: Forest Service’s annual plan approval, permit terms, fee payments, logos on maps, and agency knowledge create a symbiotic/joint-action nexus making the ban attributable to the government	Alta & Forest Service: The permit relationship is a lease/authorization; Forest Service merely approves site plans and receives a fee—no coercion, encouragement, funding, or enforcement that would make Alta’s decision state action	Court: Dismissal affirmed—facts at most show knowledge and acquiescence by the Forest Service, which is insufficient to plausibly establish state action under symbiotic‑relationship, nexus, joint‑action, or public‑function tests

Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961) (symbiotic-relationship test where private business in public building was attributable to the state)
Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974) (nexus and public-function principles for state-action analysis)
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970) (joint-action standard requires willful participation with state agents)
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982) (conduct must be fairly attributable to the state)
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991 (1982) (mere approval or acquiescence by the state is insufficient; need coercion or significant encouragement)
Milo v. Cushing Municipal Hospital, 861 F.2d 1194 (10th Cir. 1988) (public entity’s substantial role in creation/funding supports finding of state action)
Gallagher v. Neil Young Freedom Concert, 49 F.3d 1442 (10th Cir. 1995) (discusses various state-action tests and their application)
Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24 (1980) (joint-action principles)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (plausibility pleading standard)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standards—legal conclusions vs. factual allegations)