Wartman v. United Food & Commercial Workers Local 653
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 17860
| 8th Cir. | 2017Background
- Fresh Seasons (two grocery stores) closed in 2014; the Union claimed Fresh Seasons owed unpaid wages to its employees.
- Two new stores (Glen Lake’s Market and Victoria’s Market) opened in the same locations under different ownership (no Fresh Seasons ownership interest by Thomas B. Wartman; ART, LLC and Mark Ploen were owners).
- The Union picketed and ran a publicity campaign for ~6 months focused on “Tom Wartman,” photographing customers and urging boycotts; the Markets had no collective-bargaining relationship with the Union.
- Plaintiffs sued under 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) alleging the Union engaged in an unlawful secondary boycott by seeking to coerce the Markets (and their customers/suppliers) to stop doing business with others.
- The district court dismissed for failure to state a claim; the Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that disruptive effects on customers and suppliers that flow from ordinary picketing do not, without more, satisfy the statute’s prohibited “cease doing business” object.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Union’s picketing had the prohibited object under § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) — i.e., to force any person to cease doing business with any other person | Union intended to enmesh or coerce the Markets to pressure Fresh Seasons (or to cause Markets’ customers/suppliers to stop dealing with the Markets) — this satisfies the statute | Cannot have that object because Fresh Seasons was closed; picketing sought to pressure related persons, not to force the Markets to cease doing business with a primary employer | Court: Alleged interference with Markets’ customers/suppliers is the ordinary consequence of picketing and does not, by itself, show the specific “cease doing business” object required by the statute; affirm dismissal |
Key Cases Cited
- NLRB v. Local 825, Int’l Union of Operating Engineers, 400 U.S. 297 (Sup. Ct. 1971) (describes secondary boycott as pressuring third parties to force employer concessions)
- Ruzicka Elec. & Sons, Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 1, 427 F.3d 511 (8th Cir. 2005) (secondary activity violates law when union intends to enmesh neutral secondary employers in a primary dispute)
- Laborers Dist. Council v. NLRB, 688 F.3d 374 (8th Cir. 2012) (§ 8(b)(4) limits coercive union pressure on neutral/secondary employers)
- Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Allied Int’l, Inc., 456 U.S. 212 (Sup. Ct. 1982) (union conduct that foreseeably disrupts business relationships can violate § 8(b)(4)(ii)(B))
- Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. NLRB (Sand Door), 357 U.S. 93 (Sup. Ct. 1958) (statute condemns specific union conduct directed to specific objectives)
- Local 761, Int’l Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667 (Sup. Ct. 1961) (primary strikes/picketing historically lawful; predecessor statute cannot be read so broadly as to prohibit ordinary primary activity)
- NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760 (Tree Fruits), 377 U.S. 58 (Sup. Ct. 1964) (picketing that persuades customers of a secondary employer to stop trading may be barred)
- Miami Newspaper Pressmen’s Local No. 46 v. NLRB, 322 F.2d 405 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (statute not limited to interference only between primary and secondary employers; disrupting a neutral’s relations with customers/suppliers can be proscribed)