Warterfield, Robert Tracy, PD-1370-15

Background

Offense: Aggravated sexual assault of a child alleged to have occurred Oct. 1, 1989; complainant was seven years old. DNA on a 1989 t‑shirt cutting matched Warterfield after a 2010 buccal swab.
1994 plea: Warterfield pleaded guilty in a separate 1994 Dallas case (cause no. 93‑43772) under a plea agreement and a supplemental attachment (Exhibit A) listing several incident dates including 10/1/89; the supplemental terms stated the 1994 conviction "will not be used" for impeachment, as an extraneous offense, or in punishment in subsequent cases of which the prosecution had knowledge.
Procedural history: Warterfield was tried in 2012 for the 1989 offense, convicted and sentenced to life. The Fifth Court of Appeals affirmed in 2013. Warterfield sought discretionary review raising (1) that the 1994 plea barred prosecution or evidence use, and (2) ex post facto and statute‑of‑limitations concerns from post‑1994 statutory changes and later warrants.
Pretrial motions: Warterfield moved to suppress/dismiss based on the 1994 plea; the trial court denied those motions and admitted the 2010 DNA evidence; the State recalled witnesses after initial testimony.
Evidence at trial: SWIFS reports linked the 1989 t‑shirt cutting to lab number and agency identifiers; 2010 comparisons showed appellant as the major male contributor (random match probability ~1 in 4.09 quadrillion).

Issues

Issue	Warterfield's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether the 1994 plea agreement (and Exhibit A) barred prosecution or use of materials from the listed incidents	The plea (including laws existing at formation and parties' reasonable understanding) prevented use of the 1994 conviction or related materials to prosecute or to obtain warrants for the listed incidents; changes to statutes after 1994 cannot be retroactively applied	The supplemental plea only prevented use of the 1994 conviction for impeachment/extraneous‑offense/punishment purposes; it did not bar prosecution or use of investigative materials in subsequent prosecutions	Court of Appeals rejected Warterfield’s estoppel/contract bar; it found the supplemental plea did not prohibit prosecution or use of materials as argued by Warterfield (affirmed)
Whether recalling State witnesses after they were excused was improper	Trial court’s recall violated procedural expectations and prejudiced defense (consulting expert released)	Trial judge has discretion under art. 36.02 to allow testimony before argument concludes; remedy (court paid expert costs) mitigated prejudice	Issue waived for inadequate briefing; on the merits court found no abuse of discretion in recalling witnesses
Sufficiency of evidence (chain of custody and DNA linkage)	DNA was only link; chain‑of‑custody gaps and long storage rendered evidence insufficient	SWIFS reports, hospital records, mother’s testimony and lab identifiers connected t‑shirt to victim and lab number; DNA match strong	Court found evidence legally and factually sufficient to support conviction
Ex post facto/statute‑of‑limitations claim arising from post‑1994 statutory changes and extended limitations/warrants	Retroactive extensions and changes (including altering elements by adding "under 14") impaired vested contractual and substantive rights and violated Ex Post Facto and Due Process Clauses	Legislative changes and later warrants were applied within constitutional bounds; plea did not vest absolute amnesty preventing later lawful action	Court of Appeals did not find reversible Ex Post Facto or Due Process violation; conviction affirmed

Key Cases Cited

Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971) (due‑process obligations of the prosecutor to fulfill plea promises)
Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504 (1984) (promises inducing pleas must be kept to protect fundamental fairness)
Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607 (2003) (limits on retroactive revival of statutes of limitations under the Ex Post Facto Clause)
Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513 (2000) (ex post facto analysis and limits on retroactive changes affecting substantive defenses)
U.S. v. Munoz, 408 F.3d 222 (5th Cir. 2005) (breach of plea agreement can constitute plain error affecting fairness and integrity)
U.S. v. Lewis, 476 F.3d 369 (5th Cir. 2007) (plea‑agreement breach review: apply contract principles and defer to non‑clearly erroneous factual findings)