844 S.E.2d 436
Va. Ct. App.2020Background
- Employee suffered a compensable maritime injury in 2010 and filed simultaneous claims under the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Act and the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA).
- The Commission approved a 2014 compromise settlement awarding money and medical payment through August 15, 2014; Signal (Longshore carrier) paid medical bills per the LHWCA fee schedule.
- Wardell Orthopaedics treated the employee from 2010–2014 and later claimed it was underpaid; it submitted a claim to the Virginia Workers’ Compensation Commission in February 2017 seeking additional payment.
- The General Assembly enacted Code § 65.2-605.1 in 2014 and added subsection (G), effective July 1, 2019, which bars Commission adjudication of claims for services before July 1, 2014 if the provider previously accepted LHWCA payment for those services.
- Appellees moved to dismiss under § 65.2-605.1(G); the deputy commissioner and then the full Commission dismissed Wardell’s claim for lack of jurisdiction; the Court of Appeals affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Wardell's Argument | Appellees' Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 65.2-605.1(G) bars Commission adjudication of Wardell’s pending claim | § 65.2-605.1(G) should not apply to claims filed before July 1, 2019; Wardell filed in 2017 | The plain text bars adjudication of any claim for services before July 1, 2014 if provider previously accepted LHWCA payment, including pending claims | Held: § 65.2-605.1(G) applies to all claims after July 1, 2019 and bars adjudication of Wardell’s claim; dismissal affirmed |
| Whether “adjudicate” means only claims commenced after the statute’s effective date (i.e., statute should be applied prospectively) | “Adjudicate” should be read to mean commence; statute shouldn’t bar claims already filed | Statute bars adjudication (i.e., ruling on) any claim; plain text and structure show retrospective application | Held: Argument waived for failure to raise below; court also interprets “adjudicate” to permit retroactive application |
| Whether Wardell “accepted payment” under the LHWCA (i.e., statute inapplicable if payment not accepted) | Wardell contends it did not accept payment in full satisfaction and thus § 65.2-605.1(G) should not apply | Appellees produced affidavit and hearing testimony showing Signal paid Wardell under LHWCA and Wardell accepted those payments | Held: Credible evidence supports Commission finding Wardell accepted payment; § 65.2-605.1(G) applies |
| Whether retroactive application of § 65.2-605.1(G) violates due process or substantive rights | Retroactive application deprives Wardell of property/substantive rights without due process | The statute is procedural, affects remedy/jurisdiction only, and may be applied retroactively | Held: No constitutional violation; statute procedural and permissibly applied retroactively |
Key Cases Cited
- Ceres Marine Terminals v. Armstrong, 59 Va. App. 694 (2012) (commission’s construction of Act entitled to great weight)
- Llewellyn v. White, 297 Va. 588 (2019) (statutory interpretation reviewed de novo)
- Moore v. Va. Int’l Terminals, 254 Va. 46 (1997) (pre-2012 concurrent recovery under both Acts barred double recovery)
- Allen v. Mottley Construction Co., 160 Va. 875 (1933) (retroactive application of procedural time bars when legislative language indicates such intent)
- Sussex Cmty. Serv. Ass’n v. Va. Soc’y for Mentally Retarded Children, 251 Va. 240 (1996) (use of unrestrictive modifier "any" indicates intent to reach prior cases)
- Buenson Div., Aeronca, Inc. v. McCauley, 221 Va. 430 (1980) (distinguishing procedural remedies from substantive rights for retroactivity)
- Landgraf v. USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244 (1994) (change in forum or remedy does not necessarily impair substantive rights)
- Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding, Inc. v. Wardell Orthopaedics, P.C., 67 Va. App. 420 (2017) (discussing accord and satisfaction requirements)
- Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. Wardell Orthopaedics, P.C., 67 Va. App. 404 (2017) (same)