Ward v. State, Department of Public Safety
288 P.3d 94
Alaska2012Background
- Ward was convicted in a single proceeding of two sex offenses; Boles was convicted in a separate proceeding of two sex offenses.
- ASORA AS 12.63.020(a)(1)(B) requires lifetime registration for two or more sex offenses.
- Ward and Boles argued the provision is ambiguous and could require only 15 years if the offenses occurred in the same proceeding.
- The superior courts split: Ward’s court said the statute is unambiguous and requires lifetime registration; Boles’s court said the statute is ambiguous and could be read to require 15 years.
- The Alaska Supreme Court held the statute is unambiguous, requiring lifetime registration for two or more sex offenses, and affirmed Ward’s result while reversing Boles’ result.
- The court remanded to enter an order affirming DPS’s decision regarding Boles.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does AS 12.63.020(a)(1)(B) unambiguously require lifetime registration for two or more sex offenses when convicted in a single proceeding? | Ward: statute ambiguous; requires two proceedings | DPS: statute unambiguous; base language is two or more offenses | Unambiguous; lifetime registration required |
| Should legislative history override the statute’s plain meaning to allow a 15-year term? | Ward: history shows rehabilitation and sequential timing | Boles: history suggests leniency or sequencing | Legislative history does not overcome plain language |
| Are sentence-enhancement cases interpreting “two or more” convictions probative? | Ward/Boles: Carlson/Gonzalez/Rastopsoff support sequential conviction reading | Department: those cases have temporal language not present here | Not probative; ASORA text lacks temporal/consecutive language; no sequential requirement |
| Do policy or due process concerns alter the interpretation of ASORA? | Ward/Boles warn of due process/rehabilitation concerns | Policy concerns do not override plain statutory language | Policy considerations do not alter the unambiguous statutory interpretation |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Carlson, 560 P.2d 26 (Alaska 1977) (sentence-enhancement cases with temporal language not controlling here)
- Gonzales v. State, 582 P.2d 630 (Alaska 1978) (related to interpretation of 'previously been convicted' language)
- State v. Rastopsoff, 659 P.2d 630 (Alaska App. 1983) (interpreting similar language in sentence-enhancement context)
- Wooley v. State, 221 P.3d 12 (Alaska App. 2009) (interpreting ‘previously convicted’ language in related statutes)
- State v. Andrews, 707 P.2d 900 (Alaska App. 1985) (statutory interpretation of multiple offenses before judgment)
