869 F. Supp. 2d 860
E.D. Tenn.2012Background
- Plaintiffs filed a multi-count complaint seeking injunctive relief and damages related to Knox County Schools’ School Coupons program and related trade dress, copyright, and contractual disputes.
- Feredonna (Ward, WeDo Fundraising, PrintVenture) alleges it developed and published the School Coupons program and holds trademarks, copyrights, and domain rights in relation to the program.
- Defendants include Knox County, Knox County Board of Education, Scott Bacon, Mary Kerr, and Walsworth Publishing; Bacon and Kerr are Knox County Schools employees.
- Plaintiffs allege Bacon and Kerr engaged in acts to undermine Feredonna’s program, usurped control, and pressured merchants and schools, including memos, letters, and bid manipulation.
- Allegations include misappropriating trade dress and copyright, pressuring merchants not to participate, altering contracts, and pressuring schools to re-brand or terminate dealings with Feredonna.
- The court granted in part and denied in part three motions to dismiss, with several counts dismissed and others subjected to immunity and statute-of-limitations analyses, and an amended complaint instruction against Walsworth.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Are libel and defamation claims time-barred? | Ward et al. contend continuing defamatory conduct within limitations. | Bacon argues libel (V) is one-year and slander (VI) is six-month; earlier statements are untimely. | Libel and slander claims barred; no continuing-defamation theory recognized. |
| Can civil extortion be pled as part of a civil conspiracy? | Plaintiffs plead extortion through conspiracy and misuse of official position by Bacon and Kerr. | Bacon argues Tennessee lacks standalone civil-extortion claim. | Civil extortion claim survives at this stage as pleaded. |
| Are Kerr's asserted counts barred by immunity under the Tennessee Governmental Tort Liability Act (TGTLA)? | Kerr’s actions are within the scope of employment; immunity should not bar claims. | Kerr argues immunity and limitations apply to Counts IV–VII. | Immunity defense not dispositive; time-barred Counts IV–VII dismissed; immunity not fully resolved for all counts. |
| Are Counts IV–VII time-barred against Kerr under applicable statutes of limitations? | Some allegations fall within tolling or later-period conduct. | Counts IV–VII barred by statute of limitations, pre-September 6, 2010. | Counts IV–VII dismissed as time-barred, with one narrow exception for libel evidence in 2010. |
| Should Walsworth’s motion to dismiss Count III (unfair trade practices) be granted or should the complaint be clarified? | Count III resembles Tennessee Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) claim; pleading suffices. | No statutory basis identified; no common-law unfair trade practice claim; request for more definite statement. | Count III not dismissed but required to be clarified; granted more-definite-statement directive; other Counts withdrawn without prejudice. |
Key Cases Cited
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (U.S. 2007) (pleading must plead plausible claims, not mere conclusory allegations)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S. 2009) (plausibility standard for assessing complaint adequacy)
- Directv, Inc. v. Treesh, 487 F.3d 471 (6th Cir. 2007) (context-specific plausibility evaluation under Iqbal and Twombly)
- Minger v. Green, 239 F.3d 793 (6th Cir. 2001) (dismissal of mislabeled claims allowed if no prejudice from correcting theory)
- Autry v. Hooker, 304 S.W.3d 356 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) (employee immunity under TGTLA when not acting for personal gain)