Wanda Rogers v. Bromac Title Services, L.L.C., et
755 F.3d 347
| 5th Cir. | 2014Background
- Wanda Rogers worked as a closing officer for Bromac Title Services from April 2009 to April 2012 and served on a federal grand jury beginning in August 2011; she missed multiple Fridays for jury duty and later informed Bromac her service was extended.
- Rogers made two reportedly inappropriate comments at meetings with real-estate agents: one about "unprotected sex" and another joking she always answers her phone "unless I’m drinking."
- Bromac terminated Rogers two days after the April 18, 2012 comment; Bromac contends the termination was for unprofessional conduct, not jury service.
- Rogers sued under the Jury System Improvement Act (JSIA), 28 U.S.C. § 1875, claiming impermissible termination "by reason of" jury service; the district court granted summary judgment for Bromac.
- The district court applied a but‑for causation standard (drawing on Gross v. FBL Financial Services) and found Bromac offered undisputed evidence of a legitimate reason and that Rogers failed to raise a genuine issue that jury service was the but‑for cause.
- Rogers appealed, arguing the district court misapplied but‑for causation, should have applied McDonnell Douglas burden‑shifting, and improperly weighed evidence at summary judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper causation standard under JSIA | Rogers: "by reason of" does not demand exclusive cause; mixed motives or McDonnell Douglas framework should apply | Bromac: JSIA "by reason of" requires but‑for causation like ADEA after Gross | Court: Adopted Gross but‑for standard for JSIA and affirmed district court application |
| Application of burden‑shifting (McDonnell Douglas) | Rogers: District court ignored McDonnell Douglas framework | Bromac: Employer offered legitimate reason; plaintiff must show but‑for causation or pretext | Court: District court did not err; it evaluated evidence and found no genuine dispute of but‑for causation or pretext |
| Sufficiency of plaintiff’s circumstantial evidence of pretext | Rogers: Timing, inconsistent testimony, "papering" file, disparate treatment, and prior comments create fact issues | Bromac: Comments and proximate timing support legitimate nondiscriminatory reason (unprofessional conduct) | Court: Circumstantial evidence was conclusory and insufficient; timing alone inadequate given legitimate reason |
| Summary judgment standard and evidence view | Rogers: Court improperly weighed conflicting evidence and failed to view facts in plaintiff's favor | Bromac: District court properly applied summary judgment standard and credited uncontested legitimate reasons | Court: District court applied correct standard and did not err in granting summary judgment for Bromac |
Key Cases Cited
- Gross v. FBL Financial Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (Supreme Court 2009) (interprets "because of" to require but‑for causation)
- Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (Supreme Court 1993) (protected trait must have had determinative influence)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (Supreme Court 1973) (establishes burden‑shifting framework for disparate treatment claims)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (Supreme Court 1986) (summary judgment standard and when a jury could return a verdict)
- McFaul v. Valenzuela, 684 F.3d 564 (5th Cir. 2012) (summary judgment may not be defeated by conclusory allegations)
- Reed v. Neopost USA, Inc., 701 F.3d 434 (5th Cir. 2012) (comments by coworkers who did not make termination decision insufficient to show pretext)