Wanda Esker v. City of Denton, Texas
02-17-00003-CV
| Tex. App. | Oct 26, 2017Background
- Wanda Esker, a Senior Duty Officer for the Denton Police Department, reported alleged sexual harassment to HR in mid-December 2011 and again on January 13, 2012, but she initially refused to give specifics or identify the harasser.
- Separately, a department investigation (originating from an allegation about taking a toy) revealed discrepancies in Esker’s time records for Dec. 10–23, 2011; supervisors concluded she falsified time and proposed termination.
- Esker was placed on administrative leave Feb. 20, 2012, and terminated Feb. 22, 2012; she did not tell the termination decisionmaker (Chief Howell) about her HR complaints during the administrative meeting or appeal.
- Esker filed an EEOC charge in June 2012 (focused on retaliation), later disclosed the harasser’s identity during the EEOC investigation, and received a right-to-sue notice in December 2013.
- Esker sued under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA) claiming retaliation; the City moved to dismiss via plea to the jurisdiction and alternatively for summary judgment, arguing decisionmakers lacked knowledge of her HR complaints.
- The trial court granted the plea and summary judgment; the court of appeals affirmed, holding Esker failed to raise a fact issue as to causation and thus the TCHRA did not waive governmental immunity.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the TCHRA waived the City's governmental immunity by Esker pleading a prima facie retaliation claim (causation element) | Esker argued temporal proximity, prior good performance, and disparate discipline raised a fact issue that her HR complaints caused termination | City argued final decisionmaker (Chief Howell) had no knowledge of HR complaints at time of termination, so no causal link; HR personnel who knew were not decisionmakers | Held: No. Esker failed to show the final decisionmaker knew of protected activity; no disputed material fact on causation, so TCHRA did not waive immunity |
| Whether summary judgment was improper because pretext or other evidence showed retaliation | Esker claimed circumstantial evidence supported retaliation and pretext | City proffered legitimate nondiscriminatory reason (time-sheet falsification); no evidence raised pretext issue | Court did not reach merits of summary-judgment argument in detail after affirming plea; noted even on pretext Esker had not raised fact issue |
Key Cases Cited
- Tex. Nat. Res. Conservation Comm’n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d 849 (Tex. 2002) (plea to the jurisdiction standards; evidence may be considered when jurisdictional facts challenged)
- Mission Consol. ISD v. Garcia, 372 S.W.3d 629 (Tex. 2012) (TCHRA waiver requires pleading facts that state a claim; framework for jurisdictional fact disputes)
- Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217 (Tex. 2004) (jurisdictional evidence review mirrors summary-judgment analysis)
- San Antonio Water Sys. v. Nicholas, 461 S.W.3d 131 (Tex. 2015) (elements of retaliation claim under state law align with federal analogues)
- Cabral v. Brennan, 853 F.3d 763 (5th Cir.) (retaliation elements and causation standard)
- Chaney v. New Orleans Pub. Facility Mgmt., Inc., 179 F.3d 164 (5th Cir. 1999) (final decisionmaker must be aware of protected activity for causation)