116 N.E.3d 535
Ind. Ct. App.2018Background
- On Nov. 20, 2016 Delmer Dillard suffered a massive heart attack while driving, lost consciousness, drove off the road, and crashed into a house; passenger Wanda Denson was severely injured and Dillard died.
- Dillard had suffered a prior myocardial infarction in early October 2016, was hospitalized, received home health care, and was discharged from home health care as "complete" on Nov. 16, 2016; medical records contained no ongoing driving restriction.
- Denson sued the Estate for negligence and sought uninsured/underinsured motorist benefits from her insurer; the Estate asserted that a sudden medical emergency/sudden loss of consciousness negated breach.
- The Estate moved for summary judgment arguing Dillard’s loss of consciousness was unforeseeable and therefore he did not breach a duty by choosing to drive; the trial court granted summary judgment for the Estate, concluding breach was negated as a matter of law.
- On appeal, the court applied general negligence principles (reasonable-person standard and Restatement §283 guidance on disabled actors) rather than formally adopting a distinct sudden-medical-emergency affirmative defense, and affirmed summary judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Estate negated breach by showing Dillard’s heart attack and loss of consciousness were sudden and unforeseeable | Denson argued a jury could find Dillard should have foreseen risk of another cardiac event and thus breached by driving | Estate argued evidence shows the attack was sudden, unforeseeable, and medical personnel imposed no driving restriction, so breach is negated | Court held Estate met prima facie burden that the event was unforeseeable and therefore breached element was negated as a matter of law |
| Whether Indiana must formally recognize a sudden-loss-of-consciousness affirmative defense | Denson urged limits on using such a defense; amicus pushed policy concerns about plaintiff recovery | Estate urged recognition/use of sudden-medical-emergency concept to negate breach | Court declined to adopt a separate doctrine, finding existing negligence standards suffice to resolve the issue |
| Whether material factual disputes exist about Dillard’s knowledge of risk before driving | Denson pointed to prior MI and expert opinion that risk of future events was increased | Estate pointed to medical records showing improvement, no driving restriction, and lack of symptoms that day | Court found Denson’s evidence insufficient to create a genuine issue that Dillard knew or should have known of an imminent attack |
| Whether the sudden-emergency doctrine (response reasonableness) applies | Denson attempted to conflate doctrines to argue jury should consider post-attack conduct | Estate distinguished sudden-emergency doctrine from sudden medical incapacity defense | Court held sudden-emergency doctrine is distinct and not applicable here; focus is foreseeability before driving |
Key Cases Cited
- Lamb v. Mid Ind. Serv. Co., 19 N.E.3d 792 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (purpose of summary judgment and standard)
- Mint Mgmt., LLC v. City of Richmond, 69 N.E.3d 561 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (moving party’s burden on summary judgment)
- Pelliccia v. Anthem Ins. Cos., 90 N.E.3d 1226 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (de novo review of summary judgment)
- King v. Ne. Sec., Inc., 790 N.E.2d 474 (Ind. 2003) (when breach can be decided as a matter of law)
- Willis v. Westerfield, 839 N.E.2d 1179 (Ind. 2006) (explaining sudden-emergency doctrine and its prerequisites)
- Roman v. Estate of Gobbo, 791 N.E.2d 422 (Ohio 2003) (discussing recognition of sudden-loss-of-consciousness defense)
- Holcomb v. Miller, 269 N.E.2d 885 (Ind. App. 1971) (earlier Indiana case acknowledging sudden loss of consciousness defense)