Waltner v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.
231 Ariz. 484
| Ariz. Ct. App. | 2013Background
- Waltners sued Chase and CRC regarding nonjudicial foreclosure on two WaMu-era loans secured by deeds of trust listing CRC as Trustee.
- Trial court dismissed most claims; remaining claims challenged whether Chase/CRC had authority to foreclose without proving the note.
- Chase/CRC moved for summary judgment, asserting they acquired the notes through the WaMu asset transfer via FDIC receivership and thus were beneficiary with authority to foreclose.
- Waltners sought entry of default under Rule 55(a) after dismissal, arguing defense absent since no answer filed within 20 days of the dismissal ruling.
- The court denied default, granted summary judgment for Chase/CRC, and later denied Waltners’ motion for reconsideration of the summary judgment order.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether default judgment was proper where a summary judgment motion was filed | Waltners: default should issue because no answer was filed timely. | Chase/CRC: summary judgment defense tolls default under Rule 55(a). | Default judgment precluded; timely summary judgment defense precluded default. |
| Whether summary judgment was proper to enforce the deeds of trust without showing the note | Waltners: Chase/CRC must show they hold the note to foreclose. | Chase/CRC: Hogan v. Wash. Mut. Bank allows nonjudicial foreclosure without proving note ownership. | Summary judgment proper; no need to prove possession of the note before nonjudicial foreclosure. |
| Whether the denial of reconsideration for newly discovered evidence was proper | Waltners: newly discovered evidence should change outcome. | Chase/CRC: evidence not likely to change result and not diligently discovered. | Denial of reconsideration affirmed; evidence not would likely change outcome. |
Key Cases Cited
- Hogan v. Wash. Mut. Bank, N.A., 230 Ariz. 584 (2012) (nonjudicial foreclosure does not require proof of note ownership to commence)
- Davis v. Superior Court (Hannah), 25 Ariz. App. 402 (1976) (definition of 'defend' and contesting a claim)
- Rashidi v. Albright, 818 F. Supp. 1354 (D. Nev. 1993) (federal analysis supporting defense via summary judgment)
- Graham v. Goodyear Aerospace Corp., 120 Ariz. 275 (App. 1978) (Rule 7(a) pleadings; summary judgment not a pleading)
- INVST Fin. Grp. v. Chem-Nuclear Sys., Inc., 815 F.2d 391 (6th Cir. 1987) (summary judgment tolls time to answer)
- Lexington Fayette Cnty. Food & Bev. Ass’n v. Lexington-Fayette Urban Cnty. Gov’t, 131 S.W.3d 745 (Ky. 2004) (defense timing and summary judgment interplay)
- Equable Ascents Fin. v. Christian, 196 Ohio App.3d 34 (Ohio App. 2011) (summary judgment tolls rights to defense)
- Akzo Nobel Coatings, Inc. v. Wright, 936 P.2d 451 (Wyo. 1997) (summary judgment as defense to default)
- Cimarron Mortg. Co. v. Wright, 831 So.2d 18 (Ala. 2002) (summary judgment used to test pleading sufficiency)
- Grenier v. Comm’r, 306 Conn. 523 (Conn. 2012) (summary judgment testing pleadings and defenses)
- Coral Ridge Props. v. Playa Del Mar Ass’n, 505 So.2d 414 (Fla. 1987) (no pleading necessary when summary judgment disposes of suit)
- Chicago Cent. & Pac. R. Co. v. Calhoun Cnty., 816 N.W.2d 367 (Iowa 2012) (defending parties may raise defenses in pre-answer motions)
- J.E. Scheidegger Co. v. Manon, 149 S.W.3d 499 (Mo. App. 2004) (supporting default judgment defense via timely motion)