Wallace v. Dolgen Midwest, LLC, 5:12-cv-02945

Background

Wallace worked as a Red Bull district sales manager and alleges that Dollar General employees accused him of shoplifting while he was stocking shelves on or before Nov. 22, 2011, which led to his termination.
Original state-court complaint (filed Nov. 8, 2012) named Dollar General (Dolgen Midwest, LLC) and two John Doe defendants.
On Nov. 21, 2014 Wallace filed a second amended complaint (SAC) without leave, naming Susan Stull (alleged store manager) and dropping the John Does; the SAC asserts defamation and a racial-discrimination claim under Ohio Rev. Code § 4112.02(G).
The SAC would destroy diversity jurisdiction; Wallace also moved to remand.
Stull moved to strike the SAC and Dolgen Midwest joined; Wallace then belatedly moved for leave to amend.
The court considered futility (statute of limitations for defamation and plausibility for the § 4112.02(G) claim) and procedural violations under the case management order.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether joinder of Stull should be allowed or denied under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) and Rule 15	Relation back or equitable tolling allows naming Stull now; defendants concealed her identity	Joinder is futile: defamation claim is time-barred; discrimination claim fails to state a plausible § 4112.02(G) claim	Denied joinder; SAC stricken; motion for leave denied; remand motion moot
Whether alleged defamation relates back to the original complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)	Wallace invokes relation-back principles (and Krupski) because identity was concealed	Relation-back does not apply to substituting a named defendant for a John Doe; absence of knowledge is not a Rule 15(c) “mistake”	Relation back rejected; defamation claim against Stull is time-barred
Whether equitable tolling excuses the statute of limitations	Wallace contends Dolgen’s refusal to supply Stull’s name prevented timely amendment	Courts treat lack of knowledge as not constituting the required “mistake”; tolling argument insufficient	Equitable tolling rejected; statute of limitations not tolled
Whether § 4112.02(G) claim states a plausible claim under Iqbal/Twombly	Wallace alleges he was singled out because he is African‑American while white employees were not accused	SAC lacks allegations that Wallace, as a patron/customer, was denied accommodations or suffered conduct covered by the statute; merely invoking race insufficient	§ 4112.02(G) claim dismissed as implausible and not within statute’s scope

Key Cases Cited

Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962) (leave to amend may be denied for justified reasons such as futility)
Miller v. Calhoun Cnty., 408 F.3d 803 (6th Cir. 2005) (amendment is futile if amended complaint would not survive a motion to dismiss)
Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 560 U.S. 538 (2010) (relation back where correct defendant knew or should have known it would have been sued but for plaintiff’s mistake)
Smith v. City of Akron, [citation="476 F. App'x 67"] (6th Cir. 2012) (Krupski does not apply where plaintiff simply lacked knowledge and used John Doe pleadings)
Brown v. Cuyahoga Cnty., [citation="517 F. App'x 431"] (6th Cir. 2013) (absence of knowledge is not the type of mistake permitting relation back under Rule 15(c))
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading must state plausible claim to survive dismissal)
Cox v. Treadway, 75 F.3d 230 (6th Cir. 1996) (substituting a named defendant for a John Doe is a change in parties, not a mere correction)