213 Conn.App. 605
Conn. App. Ct.2022Background:
- Plaintiff Tyisha Wallace, a hard-of-hearing certified nursing assistant, applied to Caring Solutions, LLC for a home health aide position and wore hearing aids.
- During the interview, Wallace asked the interviewer (Sergeant) to speak up; Wallace explained she could communicate with her nonverbal autistic son, and the interview then focused on gaps in her employment history.
- After the interview, Wallace’s mother faxed Sergeant a document about disability discrimination; Sergeant perceived the fax as a potential threat.
- The defendant did not hire Wallace; Wallace sued under the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (CFEPA), alleging disability discrimination.
- The trial court found Wallace disabled and able to perform the job with reasonable accommodation, but credited Sergeant’s testimony that non-hiring was based on employment gaps, reliability concerns, and the fax—not Wallace’s hearing disability—and entered judgment for the defendant.
- On appeal Wallace argued the trial court applied the wrong causation standard (but-for vs. motivating factor) and should have treated pretrial statements as judicial admissions; the appellate court affirmed.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Proper causation standard under CFEPA ("because of" language) | Levy requires motivating-factor standard; CFEPA does not require but-for causation | Gross and Natofsky favor but-for where statute uses "because of"; federal precedent should guide CFEPA | Court adopts motivating-factor test for CFEPA and rejects imposing but-for causation |
| Pretrial statements as judicial admissions and weight of inconsistent explanations | Statements in defendant’s pretrial brief admitting concern about plaintiff’s hearing were binding judicial admissions; varied reasons show pretext | Pretrial brief statements were argumentative (not clear, deliberate concessions); trial court could credit witness testimony and weigh credibility | Court holds pretrial statements were not judicial admissions (at most evidentiary admissions) and trial court’s credibility-based finding was not clearly erroneous |
Key Cases Cited
- Levy v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 236 Conn. 96 (1996) (interpreting CFEPA’s "because of" language to allow mixed-motive/motivating-factor analysis)
- Board of Education v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 266 Conn. 492 (2003) (affirming motivating-factor inquiry for disparate treatment under CFEPA)
- Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (2009) (U.S. Supreme Court holding but-for standard for ADEA claims)
- Natofsky v. New York, 921 F.3d 337 (2d Cir. 2019) (applying Gross to hold but-for standard for disability claims under Rehabilitation Act/ADA in Second Circuit)
- Nassar v. University of Texas Southwestern Medical Center, 570 U.S. 338 (2013) (holding Title VII retaliation requires but-for causation; textual analysis of statute controls causation standard)
- Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion originating mixed-motive framework under Title VII)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (establishing pretext/mcDonnell-douglas burden-shifting framework)
- Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities ex rel. Arnold v. Forvil, 302 Conn. 263 (2011) (applying motivating-factor test post-Gross in Connecticut context)
- Phadnis v. Great Expression Dental Centers of Connecticut, P.C., 170 Conn. App. 79 (2017) (applying motivating-factor standard to pregnancy discrimination claim under CFEPA)