Walker Whatley v. Dushan Zatecky
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 14928
7th Cir.2016Background
- Whatley was arrested with just over 3 grams of cocaine near Robinson Community Church and charged under an Indiana statute enhancing penalties for possession within 1,000 feet of a “youth program center,” which elevated the offense from Class C to Class A felony.
- The statute defined “youth program center” as a building that “on a regular basis provides recreational, vocational, academic, social, or other programs or services for persons less than eighteen (18) years of age,” with no further objective standards.
- At trial the State presented testimony that the church hosted several youth-oriented, faith-based activities (4–6 per week), and the jury convicted Whatley of the enhanced offense; he received a 35-year sentence.
- Indiana Court of Appeals reversed, treating youth activities at the church as incidental and not converting the church into a youth program center; the Indiana Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the enhancement, reasoning that an objective observer could determine “regular” activity by observation or inquiry.
- Whatley sought federal habeas relief claiming the statute was unconstitutionally vague as applied to him; the district court found his federal claim procedurally defaulted. The Seventh Circuit held he did not default and granted the writ, finding the state courts unreasonably applied vagueness doctrine.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Was the “youth program center” definition unconstitutionally vague as applied? | Whatley: “Regular” is indeterminate; ordinary people could not know which facilities qualify; statute permits arbitrary enforcement; church’s sporadic youth activities don’t give fair notice. | State: “Regular” can be understood from facts here (4 activities/week); strict liability applies so notice of zone location is not required; similar statutes survive challenge. | Held: Statute, as applied, was unconstitutionally vague. Indiana Supreme Court’s reasoning was circular and unreasonable; habeas granted. |
| Did Whatley procedurally default his federal vagueness claim? | Whatley: He presented a federal due-process vagueness challenge in state proceedings (cited federal standards and framed claim around notice and “regular”). | State: Claim not fairly presented; defaulted. | Held: No default — state courts were fairly alerted to the federal constitutional nature; case exhausted. |
| Whether AEDPA deference barred relief (i.e., did state court unreasonably apply federal law)? | Whatley: State court applied circular/unsupportable rationale; relief warranted even under AEDPA. | State: State decision reasonable; no controlling Supreme Court case says “regular” is vague. | Held: The Indiana Supreme Court unreasonably applied vagueness precedents (circular tautology). No fairminded basis supports the outcome. |
| Remedy: What relief is appropriate? | Whatley: Release or resentencing under Class C felony. | State: Affirm conviction/enhanced sentence. | Held: Grant habeas writ; within 60 days either release or be resentenced under Class C with credit for time served. |
Key Cases Cited
- Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926) (penal statutes must give persons of ordinary intelligence fair notice)
- Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (vague laws risk arbitrary enforcement and must give reasonable opportunity to conform conduct)
- Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352 (1983) (void-for-vagueness requires definite standards to prevent arbitrary enforcement)
- Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015) (due process forbids vague criminal statutes that take away liberty without fair notice)
- Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489 (1982) (degree of vagueness tolerance varies by subject matter and severity of penalties)
- Batchelder v. United States, 442 U.S. 114 (1979) (vagueness doctrine applies to statutes fixing sentences as well as elements of crimes)
- Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (AEDPA "unreasonable application" standard: state court must correctly identify governing Supreme Court law and reasonably apply it)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (federal courts must presume state-court adjudication on merits absent indication otherwise; consider what theories could have supported the state decision)