Walker v. McGuire, 39 N.E.3d 982

Background

In Oct. 2012 Reuben D. Walker filed a putative class action after paying a $50 filing fee required by 735 ILCS 5/15-1504.1 for residential foreclosure suits; 98% was remitted to a state Foreclosure Prevention Program Fund and 2% retained by the circuit court clerk for administrative expenses.
Walker challenged constitutionality of section 15-1504.1 and the Home Act provision funding the program, alleging violations including the judicial fee-officer prohibition (Ill. Const. art. VI, § 14), separation of powers, equal protection, due process, and uniformity; he sought declaratory/injunctive relief and refunds.
The trial court certified classes (plaintiffs who paid the fee when Walker filed; all circuit court clerks as defendants), granted Walker summary judgment, and held the statute facially unconstitutional under the judicial article fee-officer ban because clerks retained 2% of fees.
The State (Attorney General) appealed directly to the Illinois Supreme Court; Walker cross‑appealed to the extent the trial court limited its ruling to the preamendment version of the statute.
While litigation was pending, the legislature amended the statutes twice (eff. June 1, 2013); the trial court limited its review to the preamendment statute and did not rule on the amended versions.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether art. VI, § 14 fee-officer prohibition applies to circuit court clerks	Fee-officer ban applies to the judicial "system" and thus to nonjudicial officers of the judicial branch such as clerks	art. VI, § 14 addresses judges' compensation; clerks are nonjudicial ministers and not "fee officers" targeted by the provision	The prohibition does not reach circuit court clerks; clerks perform nonadjudicative ministerial duties, so § 15-1504.1 does not create an unconstitutional fee office
Whether § 15-1504.1 was facially invalid under art. VI, § 14 for creating a fee officer by letting clerks keep 2%	The 2% retention makes clerks fee officers compensated from litigants, violating the constitutional ban	The statute does not make clerks adjudicative fee officers; retention is administrative and permissible	The retention did not render the statute unconstitutional under art. VI, § 14; trial court reversed
Whether Walker preserved challenge to the amended statutes	Walker argued class definition and briefing brought amended statutes before the court	State argued trial court limited its ruling to preamendment law and Walker never sought to amend complaint or class	Walker waived the cross-appeal on other constitutional grounds; court found no reason to disturb trial court’s limitation to the preamendment statute and rejected Walker’s contention that the complaint was amended by briefing
Whether this Court should review other constitutional challenges Walker raised on cross-appeal	Walker sought affirmance on alternative constitutional grounds	State argued those grounds weren’t properly before the court on cross-appeal	Court declined to address alternative grounds because they were not properly pursued on cross-appeal

Key Cases Cited

Crocker v. Finley, 99 Ill. 2d 444 (1984) (collection of court filing fees for noncourt purposes scrutinized under judicial fee-officer doctrine)
County of Kane v. Carlson, 116 Ill. 2d 186 (1987) (circuit court clerks are nonjudicial officers of the judicial branch)
Grace v. Howlett, 51 Ill. 2d 478 (1972) (compulsory arbitration invalid under fee-officer prohibition where arbitrator fees were taxed to parties and decisions entered as court judgments)
Reed v. Farmers Insurance Group, 188 Ill. 2d 168 (1999) (distinguishing Grace where arbitrator fees were not statutorily imposed on parties and review was limited)
Drury v. County of McLean, 89 Ill. 2d 417 (1982) (describing clerks as officers of the court system)