2021 IL 126086
Ill.2021Background:
- Mortgage lenders (Walker; Diamond) filed residential mortgage foreclosure complaints and paid a $50 additional filing fee created by 735 ILCS 5/15-1504.1 to fund foreclosure-prevention and abandoned-property programs (20 ILCS 3805/7.30, 7.31).
- Walker filed a putative class action challenging the fee’s constitutionality; the trial court certified classes of fee-payers and circuit clerks; the State intervened.
- On remand from this court’s earlier decision (Walker v. McGuire), plaintiffs amended and pursued claims that the statutes violate the Illinois Constitution (free access, due process, equal protection, uniformity); they sought injunction and return of fees.
- The trial court granted summary judgment for plaintiffs, finding the voluntary payment doctrine inapplicable (duress) and holding the statutes facially unconstitutional under the Free Access Clause; enforcement was enjoined, stayed pending appeal.
- The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed: it held the voluntary-payment duress exception applied and that the $50 charge is a litigation tax not sufficiently related to court operation, so the statutes violate article I, § 12 (free access); other constitutional claims were not addressed.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether voluntary-payment doctrine bars refund claims | Plaintiffs paid under duress (needed access to courts); duress exception applies | Cook County clerk: plaintiffs paid voluntarily and failed to pay under protest, so doctrine bars recovery | Duress exception applies; plaintiffs could not reasonably access courts without paying, so doctrine does not bar claims |
| Whether the $50 charge is a permissible court-related fee or an impermissible litigation tax | Fee is a tax funding general welfare foreclosure-prevention and abandoned-property programs, not court services; violates Free Access Clause | State/clerks: fee funds counseling and remediation that reduce foreclosures/blight and court burdens, so is related to court operation | The $50 is a litigation tax and its connection to court operations is too attenuated; it unreasonably interferes with access to courts and violates the Free Access Clause |
| Appropriate level of scrutiny for Free Access Clause challenge | Plaintiffs: rational-basis is appropriate but fee fails that test because it funds general welfare and targets foreclosure litigants | Defendants: rational-basis should defer to legislature’s reasonable relation to court maintenance; fee survives rational-basis given legislative findings | Court applied rational-basis and found no rational basis to impose this litigation tax on foreclosure plaintiffs because benefits are too remote from court maintenance |
| Whether court must resolve other constitutional claims (equal protection, due process, uniformity) | Plaintiffs raised multiple constitutional claims | Defendants urged reversal on voluntary-payment basis so merits unnecessary | Court did not reach other claims after deciding Free Access Clause dispositive; statutes facially invalid on that ground |
Key Cases Cited
- Crocker v. Finley, 99 Ill. 2d 444 (1984) (holding a charge that funds general welfare programs unrelated to court operation can violate Free Access Clause)
- Walker v. McGuire, 2015 IL 117138 (2015) (Illinois Supreme Court decision addressing fee-officer challenge and remanding on that narrow issue)
- Midwest Medical Records Ass’n v. Brown, 2018 IL App (1st) 163230 (2018) (appellate court recognizing implied duress where court access is conditioned on payment)
- McIntosh v. Walgreens Boots Alliance, Inc., 2019 IL 123626 (2019) (describing voluntariness and exceptions to the voluntary-payment doctrine)
- Boynton v. Kusper, 112 Ill. 2d 356 (1986) (invalidating a charge where relationship between payors and beneficiaries was too remote under Free Access principles)