Walker, Shelley
PD-1430-14
| Tex. Crim. App. | Oct 19, 2016Background
- Kenneth and Shelley Walker (grandparents and caregivers) were convicted of intentionally or knowingly causing serious bodily injury to their granddaughter B.W. after she suffered uniform second-degree burns to both feet from scalding bath water; each sentenced to 25 years.
- Medical experts for the State (Drs. Wolf and Cox) testified the burn pattern (uniform depth, clear ankle demarcation, lack of "sparing") was most consistent with forced immersion held above the tub floor for ~10–20 seconds at ~128–131°F; defense expert (Dr. Lawrence) testified the injuries could be accidental or caused by the child being blocked in the tub by another child and emphasized physical difficulty of forcibly immersing a ~28–30 lb child given appellants’ health issues.
- Appellants gave multiple, inconsistent accounts to family, medics, CPS, and police; Shelley at times estimated Kenneth was in the back of the duplex for "two or three minutes" before B.W. emerged burned—statements used by the State to infer opportunity and identity.
- The jury convicted both appellants; the court of appeals affirmed, finding the burn pattern supported forced immersion and circumstantial evidence supported inference Kenneth (and Shelley as party) caused the injuries.
- This Court (concurring/dissenting opinion) reviewed legal sufficiency under Jackson, considered expert reliability but found State experts’ testimony not so unreliable as to be impossible to credit; concluded evidence was legally insufficient to convict Shelley (speculation only) and insufficient to prove Kenneth had the specific intent/knowledge required for first-degree felony, though sufficient to infer he was the actor; would remand Kenneth’s case to consider lesser-included offenses.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Appellants' Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether medical evidence shows burns were inflicted (not accidental) | Expert testimony: uniform burns, clear demarcation, and immersion-duration/temp indicate forced immersion | Defense expert: pattern could result from accidental immersion or obstruction by another child; forcible immersion improbable given physical limitations | Medical testimony was admissible and reasonably supports forcible immersion; jury rationally could credit State experts |
| Identity—could jury rationally find Kenneth or Shelley caused the burns? | Shelley’s statements and timeline give Kenneth motive/opportunity; inconsistencies show consciousness of guilt; party liability theory for Shelley | Inconsistent statements, lack of direct evidence, and physical difficulty make attributing identity speculative; Shelley had no direct evidence placing her in bathroom | Evidence legally sufficient to support inference Kenneth was the actor (jury could credit Shelley’s time estimate); evidence insufficient to convict Shelley as actor or party beyond reasonable doubt |
| Sufficiency to prove mens rea for first-degree injury to a child (intent/knowledge of causing serious bodily injury) | Intent/knowledge can be inferred from conduct; immersion to cause pain supports intentional/knowing mental state | No proof Kenneth knew water temperature or intended serious bodily injury; could be punishment without intent to cause serious injury | Evidence insufficient to prove Kenneth acted intentionally or knowingly to cause serious bodily injury (first-degree); conviction for that degree not supported |
| Remedy—whether to acquit or remand for lesser-included offense | State: conviction affirmed | Appellants: challenge legal sufficiency; request acquittal or reversal | Agree to reverse Shelley and enter acquittal; for Kenneth, vacate first-degree conviction and remand to court of appeals to consider lesser-included offenses (concurring-in-part/dissent) |
Key Cases Cited
- Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1979) (legal-sufficiency standard: whether any rational trier of fact could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt)
- Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (discussion of legal vs. factual sufficiency; plurality language on factual-sufficiency considerations)
- Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (permitting multiple reasonable inferences; rejecting the unhelpful ‘‘inference stacking’’ rubric)
- Winfrey v. State, 323 S.W.3d 875 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (expert/scientific evidence reliability can affect legal sufficiency; certain evidence alone may be insufficient)
- Gharda USA, Inc. v. Control Solutions, Inc., 464 S.W.3d 338 (Tex. 2015) (expert opinion may be unreliable if there is an analytical gap between data and conclusion)
- Cavazos v. Smith, 132 S. Ct. 2 (U.S. 2011) (deference to jury in resolving competing medical expert theories)