Walker Ex Rel. Estate of Walker v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.
734 F.3d 1278
| 11th Cir. | 2013Background
- In the 1994 Engle class action (Brown/Engle), Florida plaintiffs tried a three‑phase class plan against major tobacco companies; Phase I tried common liability issues and returned broad findings that cigarettes cause disease, are addictive, and that each defendant engaged in various wrongful conduct.
- The Florida Supreme Court approved some Phase I findings, decertified the class for Phase III, and held the approved Phase I findings would have res judicata effect in later individual suits (Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc.).
- Lower courts disagreed over the preclusive scope: the Eleventh Circuit in Brown required showing the Phase I jury actually decided a defendant acted wrongfully as to the particular brand a plaintiff smoked; several Florida appellate courts later held the approved Phase I findings establish conduct elements for all class members.
- The district court in Waggoner applied Florida appellate rulings and held that giving preclusive effect to the approved Phase I findings does not violate defendants’ federal due process rights; later the Florida Supreme Court in Douglas confirmed that the approved Phase I findings establish the conduct elements for individual Engle plaintiffs and that claim preclusion (res judicata) applies.
- R.J. Reynolds challenged application of those preclusive findings in individual wrongful‑death suits (Walker and Duke), arguing the Phase I verdict was too ambiguous to satisfy due process; juries in the individual suits were instructed that conduct was conclusively established and awarded modest damages to plaintiffs.
- The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding federal courts must give full faith and credit to the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation so long as it meets minimum due process requirements; the court found no arbitrary deprivation of property and that R.J. Reynolds had a full and fair opportunity to litigate common liability.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Preclusive effect of Engle Phase I findings | Phase I findings establish defendants’ conduct elements for all class members; plaintiffs may rely on them in individual suits | Phase I verdict too general; plaintiffs must prove Phase I actually decided defendant acted wrongfully as to the specific brand/plaintiff | Florida Supreme Court (Douglas) and Eleventh Circuit: approved Phase I findings have res judicata effect as interpreted by Florida law; federal courts must follow that interpretation under §1738 if it satisfies due process |
| Due process challenge to state preclusion rule | N/A (plaintiffs seek preclusion) | Applying Phase I findings to later suits violates federal due process because jury did not make brand‑specific / actually‑decided findings | Eleventh Circuit: No due process violation; state rule was not arbitrary and defendants had full and fair opportunity to litigate common liability |
| Issue preclusion vs. claim preclusion (Fayerweather argument) | N/A | Defendants argued they have a constitutional right to issue preclusion (i.e., 'actually decided' requirement) rather than claim preclusion | Florida Supreme Court: Engle applied claim‑preclusion (res judicata); Eleventh Circuit: federal due process does not require adoption of federal common‑law issue‑preclusion form here |
| Whether Phase I jury actually decided brand‑specific conduct | Plaintiffs: jury decided common conduct applicable to all brands/class members | Defendants: ambiguity in verdict prevents concluding Phase I decided conduct as to particular brands/plaintiffs | Eleventh Circuit: Florida Supreme Court permissibly looked beyond the verdict to the record and trial plan to conclude the jury decided common liability issues; not arbitrary under due process |
Key Cases Cited
- Engle v. Liggett Group, Inc., 945 So. 2d 1246 (Fla. 2006) (Florida Supreme Court decertified class for Phase III and held certain Phase I findings would have res judicata effect)
- Brown v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 611 F.3d 1324 (11th Cir. 2010) (initial Eleventh Circuit interpretation requiring proof that Phase I actually decided defendant‑specific issues)
- Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Douglas, 110 So. 3d 419 (Fla. 2013) (Florida Supreme Court held approved Phase I findings establish conduct elements for all class members and applied res judicata)
- Fayerweather v. Ritch, 195 U.S. 276 (1904) (discussed concerning limits of giving preclusive effect to issues not actually decided)
- Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373 (1985) (Full Faith and Credit Act subject to Due Process constraints)
- Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982) (minimum procedural requirements of due process for preclusion principles)
- Richards v. Jefferson County, Ala., 517 U.S. 793 (1996) (extreme applications of res judicata may conflict with federal rights)
- Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992) (historical context on tobacco litigation cited by the court)
