Walker-Butler v. Berryhill
857 F.3d 1
| 1st Cir. | 2017Background
- Walker-Butler applied for Title II disability benefits; ALJ initially denied, Appeals Council denied, and she sought judicial review in district court. The district court remanded her claim for further administrative proceedings in December 2014.
- On remand the ALJ issued a partially favorable decision dated August 27, 2015, and mailed notice to Walker-Butler; the notice explained the decision would become final 61 days after the notice unless she filed written exceptions or the Appeals Council assumed jurisdiction.
- Walker-Butler filed no written exceptions; the Appeals Council did not assume jurisdiction, so under 20 C.F.R. §404.984(c) the ALJ’s decision became the Commissioner’s final decision when the Appeals Council’s 60-day window expired.
- Walker-Butler filed a federal complaint on January 4, 2016; the Commissioner moved to dismiss as untimely, calculating the 60-day filing period under 42 U.S.C. §405(g) expired December 28, 2015 (a Monday) after accounting for the weekend.
- Walker-Butler argued 20 C.F.R. §422.210(c)’s five-day presumption of receipt (used on initial Appeals Council notices) delayed finality and thus her filing was timely; the district court rejected that argument and dismissed for untimeliness.
- The First Circuit considered whether §422.210(c)’s five-day presumption applies to final decisions on remand when no written exceptions are filed and the Appeals Council does not assume jurisdiction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 5-day receipt presumption in 20 C.F.R. §422.210(c) applies to final decisions on remand where no written exceptions are filed and the Appeals Council declines to assume jurisdiction | Walker-Butler: §422.210(c) should apply to the ALJ’s notice on remand, presuming receipt 5 days later and thereby extending the deadlines so her Jan 4, 2016 filing is timely | Commissioner: §422.210(c) applies only to Appeals Council actions on initial decisions; on remand finality is governed by §404.984(c) and the 60-day clock runs from the date the ALJ’s decision becomes final after the Appeals Council’s 60-day window | The 5-day presumption does not apply on remand in cases without written exceptions; affirming dismissal as untimely |
Key Cases Cited
- Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467 (equitable tolling of social security filing period acknowledged)
