Waldron v. Roark, 298 Neb. 26

Waldron sued Lancaster County Deputy Roark under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Fourth Amendment violations arising from Roark’s entry to Waldron’s home to serve an arrest warrant on Copple.
The February 22, 2012 incident involved a no-knock style entry, alleged lack of badge/warrant presentation, and ensuing handcuffing and injuries to Waldron.
District court granted summary judgment to Roark, finding Roark entitled to qualified immunity on Waldron’s knock‑and‑announce and excessive force claims, and no Monell liability.
Waldron appealed; this Court previously found material issues of fact on knock‑and‑announce and excessive force, remanding for further proceedings.
On remand, the district court again granted summary judgment, this time concluding Roark had qualified immunity after analyzing the prongs of the § 1983 framework.
The Nebraska Supreme Court affirms, applying the Federal qualified immunity framework and concluding Waldron did not show a clearly established right violated by Roark’s conduct.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Roark is entitled to qualified immunity on the knock‑and‑announce claim	Waldron argues no-knock violated clearly established rights.	Roark contends exigent circumstances could justify no-knock entry; right not clearly established.	Roark entitled to qualified immunity on knock‑and‑announce.
Whether Roark is entitled to qualified immunity for Waldron's arrest	Roark lacked probable cause to arrest Waldron and used excessive force.	Probable cause existed; reasonable force was permissible under the circumstances.	Roark entitled to qualified immunity; arrest and force not clearly established as unlawful.
Whether there was evidence of a Lancaster County policy or custom causing Waldron's damages	County unofficial policy or custom led to Roark’s actions.	No evidence that County policy or custom caused the injuries; statements are speculative.	No triable Monell claim; policy or custom not proven.

Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011) (clearly established standard requires particularized context)
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (precedes case-by-case analysis of immunity)
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) (two-prong test for clearly established rights; context matters)
Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995) (reasonableness of entry and entry method in searches)
Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146 (2004) (warrantless arrest must be supported by probable cause for specific offense)
Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability requires policy or custom; not respondeat superior)
City and County of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765 (2015) (limits on clearly established rights; context-specific analysis)
White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548 (2017) (clarifies need for particularized, fact-specific clearly established analysis)
Copeland v. Locke, 613 F.3d 875 (2010) (Eighth Circuit on excessive force and clearly established rights)
U.S. v. Lucht, 18 F.3d 541 (1994) (exigent circumstances and knock-and-announce relevance (Eighth Cir.))