Waldock v. Amber Harvest Corp.
820 N.W.2d 755
| N.D. | 2012Background
- Waldock appeals a summary-judgment quiet title ruling concerning 25% of the minerals under a Mountrail County tract held in Edwardson’s Estate successors’ interests.
- Edwardson initially owned 50% of the minerals; the U.S. owned the other 50%.
- In 1954, the estate’s administrator deeded to Van Horn, reserving 25% of all minerals to Edwardson’s Estate.
- The deed granted Van Horn all right, title, and interest of the decedent at death, “excepting and reserving… an undivided 25% interest in all of the oil, gas, and other minerals.”
- Waldock’s predecessor in interest became the target of the quiet-title action; the district court held the deed was effectively a quitclaim, reserved 25% to the Estate, and not governed by the Duhig rule.
- The North Dakota Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the deed’s plain language conveyed 25% to Waldock’s predecessor and reserved 25% to the Estate, and that Duhig did not apply to this deed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does the administrator’s deed operate as a quitclaim and reserve 25% to the Estate? | Waldock argues the deed is more than a quitclaim and overconveys. | Estate contends the deed’s plain language conveys only what the grantor purported to give. | No overconveyance; language conveys 25% to Waldock’s predecessor and reserves 25% to the Estate. |
| Is the Duhig rule applicable to this administrator’s deed? | Waldock claims Duhig should apply to limit or ignore the reservation. | Estate argues Duhig is inapplicable to this deed given its language. | Duhig not applicable; deed language controls and yields no overconveyance. |
| What is the correct interpretive approach for the deed’s language? | The deed should be read as conveying 50% to the grantee, with reservation; in effect possibly overconveying. | Interpretation follows the deed’s four corners; it reserves 25% to the Estate. | The grant conveyed 25% to Waldock’s predecessor and reserved 25% to the Estate; interpretation aligns with the grant language. |
Key Cases Cited
- Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Co., 135 Tex. 503, 144 S.W.2d 878 (Tex. 1940) (establishes the rule that a grant cannot be both made and reserved when the grantor lacks sufficient interest)
- Miller v. Kloeckner, 1999 ND 190, 600 N.W.2d 881 (N.D. 1999) (recognizes Duhig may apply even where there is a limited or no warranty, focusing on what the grantor purported to convey)
- Gawryluk v. Poynter, 2002 ND 205, 654 N.W.2d 400 (N.D. 2002) (applies Duhig framework to deeds with overconveyance concerns)
- Mau v. Schwan, 460 N.W.2d 131 (N.D. 1990) (estoppel principles in title disputes related to conveyances)
- Sibert v. Kubas, 357 N.W.2d 495 (N.D. 1984) (title dispute and conveyance interpretation guidance under North Dakota law)
- Kadrmas v. Sauvageau, 188 N.W.2d 753 (N.D. 1971) (early guidance on mineral conveyance interpretation under ND law)
- Carkuff v. Balmer, 2011 ND 60, 795 N.W.2d 303 (N.D. 2011) (discusses how deed language governs intent and effect, particularly with quitclaim phrasing)