Waite v. Utah Labor Comm'n
2017 UT 86
| Utah | 2017Background
- Petitioners James Waite and Luis Ortega suffered workplace injuries, filed for workers’ compensation within six years, and later sought additional permanent total disability benefits more than 12 years after their accidents.
- Utah Code § 34A-2-417(2)(a) contains two timing requirements: (i) file an application within six years of the accident; (ii) by 12 years after the accident the employee must be able to meet the burden of proving entitlement to the compensation claimed.
- Administrative Law Judges denied both petitioners’ late claims under § 34A-2-417(2)(a)(ii); the Utah Labor Commission declined to rule on the statute’s constitutionality as an agency.
- The court of appeals certified the consolidated questions to the Utah Supreme Court; this opinion addresses whether § 34A-2-417(2)(a)(ii) is a statute of repose and whether it violates the Utah Constitution’s Open Courts Clause.
- The Supreme Court concluded § 34A-2-417(2)(a)(ii) is a statute of repose but upheld it under the Open Courts Clause under the Berry/Judd framework, affirming the Commission’s orders.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Is § 34A-2-417(2)(a)(ii) a statute of limitation or a statute of repose? | Waite/Ortega: The 12-year bar functions as a statute of repose because additional claims may not accrue until after deterioration/discovery, so the statute can extinguish rights before accrual. | WCF: The cause of action accrues at the accident; the 12-year period runs from accrual, so it is a statute of limitation. | The Court: It is a statute of repose because it is tied to the accident date and can bar claims that accrue later due to changed conditions. |
| Does the statute of repose violate the Utah Constitution’s Open Courts Clause by abrogating a remedy? | Waite/Ortega: The 12-year repose abrogates an existing remedy and is therefore unconstitutional under the Open Courts Clause. | State/Respondents: Even if abrogating, the statute serves legitimate social/economic ends (insurer/employer predictability) and satisfies Berry/Judd review. | The Court: Although the statute abrogates a prior remedy, under Berry (as refined by Judd) the legislature’s objective is "fairly debatable"; the 12-year repose addresses clear social/economic evils and is a reasonable, narrowly tailored means—constitutional. |
| What standard governs Open Courts Clause review of statutes that abrogate remedies? | Petitioners: Courts should independently scrutinize whether a "clear social or economic evil" exists and whether abrogation is reasonable. | Respondents: Defer to legislature where its findings/policy judgment are debatable; apply Judd’s deference. | The Court: Applies Berry’s three-part test but follows Judd’s deference where legislative purpose is "fairly debatable." It upholds the statute under that test. |
| Should the Court overrule or narrow Berry/Judd and adopt a different Open Courts framework? | Justice Lee (concurrence): Argues Berry should be overruled; open courts originally protected vested causes and access, not a broad substantive bar on prospective legislative change. | Majority: Declines to overrule; not necessary to resolve the case and would be premature without an appropriate vehicle. | Result: Majority preserves Berry/Judd approach here; two concurrences urge reconsideration of Berry (Justice Lee would overrule; Justice Pearce urges careful reexamination). |
Key Cases Cited
- Berry ex rel. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985) (established the three-part Open Courts test for legislative abrogation of remedies)
- Judd v. Drezga, 103 P.3d 135 (Utah 2004) (refined Berry by directing deference to legislature where its factual/policy findings are "fairly debatable")
- Employers’ Reinsurance Fund v. Labor Commission, 289 P.3d 572 (Utah 2012) (discussed Commission’s continuing jurisdiction over workers’ comp awards and prior dicta describing a 12-year limit)
- Masich v. U.S. Smelting, Ref. & Mining Co., 191 P.2d 612 (Utah 1948) (addressed limits on vested rights and legislative power to alter remedies)
- Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 274 P. 139 (Utah 1929) (historical precedent describing a workers’ compensation claim as a continuing claim that may produce multiple awards)