253 So. 3d 203
La. Ct. App.2018Background
- Plaintiffs Wainwright and Pernici (connected local figures) discovered a municipal water-billing error and, through consultants (Manchac) and counsel (Grubb), presented the findings to City officials under an NDA and sought payment for a share of increased revenue.
- City officials (Mayor Tyler and CAO Crawford) learned of demands for payment and, after a public records request and media reporting, publicly characterized the demands as "blackmail", "extortion" or a "shakedown" and referenced referral of the matter to federal investigators.
- Plaintiffs sued Tyler and Crawford for defamation (March 2017), alleging statements implied criminal conduct and were defamatory per se; defendants moved to strike under La. C.C.P. art. 971 (anti-SLAPP) and sought attorneys’ fees.
- Defendants argued their statements addressed a matter of public concern, were constitutionally protected speech, and the plaintiffs—being limited-purpose public figures—must show actual malice; affidavits and documentary record were submitted.
- Trial court granted the special motion to strike, finding the speech protected, the statements were opinion or fair comment, and plaintiffs failed to show a probability of success; it awarded defendants $18,832.70 in fees. Plaintiffs appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether defendants' statements are protected under La. C.C.P. art. 971 (anti-SLAPP) | Wainwright/Pernici: statute should not be used by public officials against private citizens; comments harmed plaintiffs | Tyler/Crawford: statements concerned a public issue (water billing) and were made in public forums or in response to media—thus prima facie protected | Court: Statements addressed public matter; art. 971 applies and defendants made prima facie showing of protected activity |
| Whether statements ("blackmail", "extortion", "shakedown") are defamatory per se | Plaintiffs: those words accused them of crimes and imply DOJ/FBI referral, so falsity and malice presumed | Defendants: words were rhetorical opinion/fair comment on the reported facts and did not name plaintiffs as criminals or state DOJ had formally accused them | Court: Words viewed in context were subjective opinion/fair comment, not unambiguous accusations of crime; plaintiffs failed to show probability of success on defamation-per-se claim |
| Whether plaintiffs are limited-purpose public figures (affecting standard of fault) | Plaintiffs: characterized as private citizens harmed by official statements | Defendants: plaintiffs injected themselves into a public controversy through their conduct and communications about billing and compensation | Court: Plaintiffs are limited-purpose public figures for this controversy; must prove actual malice and failed to show it |
| Whether the challenged statements were made with actual malice or reckless disregard for truth | Plaintiffs: defendants acted negligently/recklessly and caused reputational injury | Defendants: statements were based on reported facts, reasonable inferences, and internal city information; no knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard | Court: No convincing evidence of actual malice; plaintiffs did not establish probability of success |
Key Cases Cited
- New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (recognizes actual malice standard for public officials)
- Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (defines limited-purpose public figure doctrine)
- Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1 (opinion v. fact in defamation law)
- Greenbelt Co-op. Pub. Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (contextual rhetorical use of "blackmail" not libel)
- Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (distinguishes levels of First Amendment protection)
- Sassone v. Elder, 626 So.2d 345 (La. definition and elements of defamation)
- Shelton v. Pavon, 236 So.3d 1233 (La. two-part analysis under art. 971 / anti-SLAPP)