Wagner v. State
539 S.W.3d 298
Tex. Crim. App.2018Background
- Paul Henri Wagner was charged under Tex. Penal Code § 25.07(a)(2)(A) for communicating "in a threatening or harassing manner" with his estranged wife in violation of a protective order entered after findings of family violence.
- After the order, Wagner repeatedly texted, called, emailed his ex-wife, professing love, pleading to reconcile, and contacting third parties (church members); she asked him to stop.
- Police were contacted after a forwarded email; Wagner was tried by jury, convicted, and sentenced to one year in jail (probated) and a fine.
- On direct appeal Wagner argued the statute was overbroad and unconstitutionally vague (First and Fourteenth Amendments); the court of appeals affirmed.
- The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted review to construe "communicates...in a...harassing manner," and to decide the overbreadth and vagueness challenges; it affirmed the court of appeals.
Issues
| Issue | Wagner's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Meaning of “communicates...in a...harassing manner” | Should be narrowly read (e.g., requires lack of legitimate purpose and substantial emotional distress) | Plain meaning: conduct that persistently disturbs, bothers continually, or pesters | Court: plain meaning applies; requires knowingly/intentionally communicating in a manner that would persistently disturb, bother, or pester |
| First Amendment overbreadth | Statute criminalizes protected speech (expressions of love, child/financial matters) | Statute narrowly applies to persons subject to protective orders and targets unprotected harassment; not a substantial burden on protected speech | Court: statute not overbroad; targets non‑protected harassing communications by persons already judicially restricted |
| Vagueness (due process) | "Harassing" undefined; lacks notice—should require substantial emotional distress or clearer standard | Plain meaning is commonly understood; scienter (knowingly/intentionally) narrows scope and gives fair notice | Court: not impermissibly vague as applied to Wagner; his repeated unsolicited communications would be understood to be harassing |
| Content‑based / strict scrutiny | Statute is content‑based and should receive strict scrutiny | Issue was inadequately briefed on appeal; normal presumption of validity applies | Court: declined to reach merits of this claim (dismissed grounds 2 & 3) because lower court did not address it adequately |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285 (2008) (first step in overbreadth analysis is statutory construction)
- Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442 (2008) (overbreadth requires a substantial number of unconstitutional applications judged against the statute’s legitimate sweep)
- Scott v. State, 322 S.W.3d 662 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (telephone‑harassment statute did not implicate First Amendment because it targeted invasions of privacy intended to inflict emotional distress)
- Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489 (1982) (vagueness analysis: examine as‑applied before facial challenges; plaintiffs engaging in clearly proscribed conduct cannot complain of vagueness as to others)
- Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1 (2010) (perfect clarity not required; context matters in vagueness analysis)
