Wachtendorf, John Allen Jr.
PD-0280-15
| Tex. | Mar 31, 2015Background
- Defendant Wachtendorf moved to suppress blood-test results, arguing the warrantless draw violated Missouri v. McNeely.
- Trial court held hearings, announced on the record that it would grant the suppression, and the State stated it would appeal.
- On the same day the judge signed a written order granting the motion, but the clerk did not file-mark the order immediately; the clerk later filed it after the 20-day appellate deadline had passed.
- The State filed its notice of appeal 85 days after the judge signed the order and a few days after the clerk filed the previously signed order.
- The Third Court of Appeals dismissed the State's appeal for lack of jurisdiction as untimely under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 44.01(d).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Wachtendorf) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| When does the State’s 20‑day appeal clock under Art. 44.01(d) begin to run? | The State: Starting point should be when the State has notice of a signed, filed order (not merely the judge’s signature). | Wachtendorf: It begins when the trial judge signs the order. | Held: The clock begins when the trial judge signs the order. |
| Does an oral ruling start the appellate deadline? | The State: Oral ruling without filed written order creates unfairness if State has no notice. | Wachtendorf: Oral rulings are not “orders”; only a signed written order triggers the clock. | Held: Oral rulings do not constitute an appealable order; a signed written order is required. |
| Is the State excused for failing to learn of an unsigned/unfiled signed order? | The State: Lack of actual notice of the signed order makes strict application unfair. | Wachtendorf: State had constructive means to verify (e.g., call the court) and was not diligent. | Held: Lack of notice is not an exception; precedent requires starting the clock on the judge’s signature. |
| Was the State’s appeal timely? | The State: Appeal should be allowed because it lacked notice of the order until after filing deadline. | Wachtendorf: Notice was untimely; dismissal appropriate. | Held: Appeal untimely; dismissed for want of jurisdiction. |
Key Cases Cited
- Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (U.S. 2013) (warrant requirement analysis for nonconsensual blood draws)
- State v. Rosenbaum, 818 S.W.2d 398 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (Art. 44.01(d) appellate timetable begins when trial judge signs order)
- Sutton v. Bage, 822 S.W.2d 55 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (reaffirming that "entered by the court" means judge's signing)
- State v. Sanavongxay, 407 S.W.3d 252 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (order must be in writing and signed to be appealable)
- Olivo v. State, 918 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (timely notice of appeal is jurisdictional)
