W. Va. Dept. of Transportation, DMV v. David King, Administrator of the Estate of Wilma Ann King
238 W. Va. 369
| W. Va. | 2016Background
- Passenger Wilma Ann King died in a 2013 crash involving driver Doris Fay Peyton, whose license had been suspended in 2007 and reinstated in 2009.
- King (as administrator of decedent’s estate) amended his negligence complaint to add the West Virginia DMV, alleging the DMV negligently reinstated Peyton without submitting Peyton’s medical file to the Driver’s License Advisory Board as required by DMV rules.
- DMV moved for summary judgment asserting qualified immunity, arguing referral to the Advisory Board was discretionary.
- The Circuit Court of Cabell County denied summary judgment, holding that the applicable 2006 DMV regulation (W. Va. Code R. § 91-5-3) created a nondiscretionary duty to refer medical files to the Advisory Board, so DMV was not immune.
- The Supreme Court of Appeals reviewed the denial de novo and reversed, holding the 2006 rule authorized ("may") but did not mandate referral; thus the DMV’s action was discretionary and entitled to qualified immunity.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the 2006 DMV regulation required mandatory referral of a licensee’s medical file to the Driver’s License Advisory Board before reinstatement | King: § 91-5-3.3.c requires the Commissioner to review the Advisory Board’s recommendation before deciding, which implies a duty to submit medical information to obtain that recommendation | DMV: § 91-5-3.3.a uses "may"—authorizing but not forcing referral; other provisions show discretionary review and actions | The Court: Referral was discretionary—§ 91-5-3 read in whole shows "may" empowers DMV to require referral but does not mandate it |
| Whether DMV is entitled to qualified immunity for failing to refer Peyton’s medical records | King: Denial of mandatory duty means act was nondiscretionary, so no immunity | DMV: Because referral was discretionary, its failure to refer is a discretionary governmental function protected by qualified immunity | The Court: DMV’s conduct was discretionary; absent a showing of violation of clearly established law or malice, DMV is immune—summary judgment should be granted |
Key Cases Cited
- Robinson v. Pack, 223 W. Va. 828, 679 S.E.2d 660 (2009) (denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine)
- Findley v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 213 W. Va. 80, 576 S.E.2d 807 (2002) (de novo review of denial of summary judgment)
- Reg’l Jail & Corr. Facility Auth. v. A.B., 234 W. Va. 492, 766 S.E.2d 751 (2014) (framework for determining immunity for state, agencies, and officials)
- Parkulo v. W. Va. Bd. of Probation & Parole, 199 W. Va. 161, 483 S.E.2d 507 (1996) (absolute immunity for policy-making acts)
- State v. Chase Sec., Inc., 188 W. Va. 356, 424 S.E.2d 591 (1992) (standards for denying immunity for discretionary acts that violate clearly established rights or are fraudulent/malicious)
- Parkins v. Londeree, 146 W. Va. 1051, 124 S.E.2d 471 (1962) (statutory/regulatory construction must consider the act or statute as a whole)