W. Va. Board of Education and L. Wade Linger, Jr. v. Jorea M. Marple
236 W. Va. 654
| W. Va. | 2015Background
- Dr. Jorea Marple was the State Superintendent of Schools for West Virginia, employed under an at-will contract; she was terminated by the West Virginia Board of Education in November 2012 after routine and follow-up board votes and a public statement explaining the Board’s desire for a change in leadership given statewide education performance.
- Marple sued the Board and Board president L. Wade Linger, Jr., alleging violations of due process under the West Virginia Constitution (liberty and property interests), plus breach of contract, defamation, and false light.
- The Board and Linger moved to dismiss on immunity grounds (sovereign immunity and common-law qualified immunity); the circuit court denied the motion, relying in part on the Board’s state-purchased liability insurance.
- The Supreme Court of Appeals granted immediate review of the interlocutory denial under the collateral-order doctrine and reviewed the denial de novo.
- The Court held that (1) the state insurance-policy exception to sovereign immunity does not waive qualified immunity unless the insurance policy expressly so provides, and (2) Marple’s complaint failed to allege a clearly established constitutional or statutory violation sufficient to overcome qualified immunity, so the complaint was dismissed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether denial of motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity is immediately appealable | Marple did not dispute appealability | Board/Linger argued immunity denial is collateral and appealable | Denial is an interlocutory collateral order and immediately appealable (court reviews de novo) |
| Whether state-purchased liability insurance waives qualified immunity | Marple argued insurance precludes immunity defenses | Board/Linger argued insurance statute waives only sovereign (constitutional) immunity, not qualified immunity | Insurance exception to sovereign immunity applies only to constitutional/state-fiscal immunity; qualified immunity survives unless the policy expressly waives it |
| Whether Board's public statement and termination implicated a protected liberty interest (stigma-plus) | Marple argued statement damaged reputation and future employment prospects | Board/Linger argued statement did not impute dishonesty/criminality and merely expressed loss of confidence/need for change | No liberty interest: statement did not stigmatize (no charge of dishonesty/immorality/criminality) and did not foreclose future employment |
| Whether Marple had a property interest in continued employment despite at-will status | Marple cited positive evaluations, pay raise, press release, and alleged customs to show entitlement | Board/Linger relied on Constitution, statute, and contract expressly making the superintendent an at-will position | No property interest: constitution, statute, and unambiguous contract created at-will employment; customs/usage cannot override clear written terms |
Key Cases Cited
- Pittsburgh Elevator Co. v. W. Va. Bd. of Regents, 172 W.Va. 743, 310 S.E.2d 675 (W. Va. 1983) (state insurance exception defeats constitutional sovereign-immunity bar when recovery is sought under state liability coverage)
- Parkulo v. W. Va. Bd. of Probation & Parole, 199 W.Va. 161, 483 S.E.2d 507 (W. Va. 1996) (insurance contract must expressly alter or waive common-law immunities; insurance terms govern if they expressly change immunities)
- W. Va. Reg’l Jail & Corr. Facility Auth. v. A.B., 234 W.Va. 492, 766 S.E.2d 751 (W. Va. 2014) (framework for distinguishing discretionary vs. ministerial acts and qualified-immunity analysis)
- Hutchison v. City of Huntington, 198 W.Va. 139, 479 S.E.2d 649 (W. Va. 1996) (heightened pleading required where immunities are implicated; steps for qualified-immunity inquiry)
- Chase Securities, Inc. v. State, 188 W.Va. 356, 424 S.E.2d 591 (W. Va. 1992) (qualified-immunity standard for discretionary acts — protected unless clearly established rights violated)
- Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (U.S. 1985) (denial of immunity is an appealable collateral order because immunity is immunity from suit)
- Waite v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 161 W.Va. 154, 241 S.E.2d 164 (W. Va. 1977) (due-process inquiry: whether a liberty or property interest exists and, if so, what process is due)
- Wilhelm v. W. Va. Lottery, 198 W.Va. 92, 479 S.E.2d 602 (W. Va. 1996) (loss of confidence/claims of incompetence generally do not create stigma sufficient to trigger liberty interest)