W.H. v. D.W.
2013 D.C. App. LEXIS 687
D.C.2013Background
- After the mother (C.W.) died, her son D.W. (the children's half-brother) and the maternal grandmother J.W. filed for joint legal and physical custody of T.H. and W.H. IV under the D.C. Safe and Stable Homes for Children and Youth Act (the Act); the Family Court had earlier granted temporary custody to them with supervised visitation for the father, W.H.
- D.W. lived with the children since their births, performed primary caregiving (food, clothing, schooling, medical appointments), and stopped school to care for them; J.W. provided frequent contact and assistance but did not reside in the same household for relevant statutory periods.
- W.H., the biological father, had minimal past contact, missed visits, was behind on child support, lived in Virginia, and challenged third-party standing and the removal of custody from him.
- The Family Court found D.W. had statutory standing as a third party, discredited W.H.’s testimony, concluded the parental presumption was rebutted by clear and convincing evidence, and awarded joint legal and physical custody to D.W. and J.W., with supervised visitation to W.H.
- On appeal W.H. argued (1) biological-parent preference under the Act, (2) the Act’s third‑party standing is constitutionally unsupported, and (3) D.W. and J.W. lacked statutory standing.
- The D.C. Court of Appeals affirmed: D.W. had statutory and Article III standing; J.W. lacked statutory standing but could be included in custody under the court’s best‑interests authority; the parental presumption was properly rebutted by clear and convincing evidence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether third parties have standing under the Act to file for custody | D.W.: he meets §16‑831.02(a)(1)(B) (resided with children and primarily assumed parental duties); J.W.: involved caregiver and should be included | W.H.: Act’s third‑party standing is not a constitutionally recognized undertaking and the plaintiffs lack standing | D.W. has statutory standing and meets Article III injury‑in‑fact; J.W. does not meet statutory standing requirements but may be included under court’s best‑interests authority |
| Whether J.W. qualifies as a de facto parent or third‑party complainant | J.W.: frequent caregiver with longstanding role warrants relief | W.H.: she did not live with the children for statutory periods or hold herself out as a parent with parental agreement | J.W. is not a de facto parent nor a qualifying third party under the Act, but court properly included her in custody under §16‑831.04(a)(5) and §16‑831.13 if in children’s best interests |
| Whether the parental presumption in favor of the biological father was rebutted | Plaintiffs: clear and convincing evidence shows W.H. was unwilling/unable, his custody would harm children, and exceptional circumstances exist | W.H.: as biological father he has a preferred status; removing custody requires extremely sufficient evidence | Court: parental presumption was rebutted by clear and convincing evidence (lack of involvement, missed visits, failure in home study, minimal contact, children's fears) and exceptional circumstances were detailed in writing |
| Whether award of joint custody to D.W. and J.W. complied with best‑interests standard | Plaintiffs: joint custody with D.W. (and J.W. as caregiver) serves continuity, emotional needs, and children’s preference | W.H.: award improperly overrides biological‑parent preference | Court: having found presumption rebutted, applied §16‑831.08 best‑interests factors and affirmed joint custody to D.W. and J.W. (permitted under §16‑831.04(a)(5)) |
Key Cases Cited
- Gaetan v. Weber, 729 A.2d 895 (D.C. 1999) (standing is a question of law; underlying facts reviewed for clear error)
- Grayson v. AT & T Corp., 15 A.3d 219 (D.C. 2011) (statutory rights can supply Article III injury‑in‑fact; standing threshold principles)
- Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975) (Article III standing requires a personal stake in the outcome)
- United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (statutes can create legally cognizable injuries and adversarial posture can satisfy Article III)
- Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000) (parents have a fundamental liberty interest in custody and childrearing decisions)
- Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (heightened proof requirements where parental rights are at stake)
- In re D.S., 52 A.3d 887 (D.C. 2012) (parental presumption can be overcome only by clear and convincing evidence under D.C. law)