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W.D. v. Archdiocese of Miami, Inc. Archdiocese of Miami, a Corporation Sole Archbishop Wenski, etc.
197 So. 3d 584
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 2016
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Background

  • Plaintiff attended a Catholic school (Archdiocese-operated) from 1980–1986 and alleged three priests sexually abused him as a child; his mother reported an early off-campus incident to the school.
  • Plaintiff alleges traumatic amnesia/repressed memories caused by the abuse and threats by the priests; he only began to recall the abuse in 2013.
  • He sued the Archdiocese and school (and others) in 2013–2014 asserting negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and respondeat superior.
  • Trial court dismissed prior complaints under the statute of limitations; plaintiff amended and reasserted claims; defendants moved to dismiss the second amended complaint as time‑barred.
  • Plaintiff invoked the delayed‑discovery rule (Hearndon), statutory tolling under sections 95.11(7) and (9), and equitable estoppel (fraudulent concealment/inducement).
  • The Fourth District affirmed dismissal with prejudice, holding the delayed‑discovery rule and section 95.11(7) do not extend to institutional/vicarious‑liability claims and section 95.11(9) is prospective and cannot revive claims time‑barred before July 1, 2010; equitable estoppel was not pleaded.

Issues

Issue Plaintiff's Argument Defendant's Argument Held
Whether Hearndon delayed‑discovery doctrine tolls claims against the Archdiocese/school Hearndon applies because repressed memories delayed discovery of abuse and causation Hearndon is limited to intentional torts against the individual perpetrator, not employer/institutional claims Denied — Hearndon limited to intentional torts against perpetrators, not institutional/vicarious claims
Whether §95.11(7) (7‑year/alternative accrual) applies to plaintiff's claims against institutional defendants §95.11(7) applies because plaintiff's claims are based on abuse and include intentional infliction of emotional distress and respondeat superior based on priests’ intentional acts §95.11(7) applies only to individual perpetrator intentional torts as defined by cross‑referenced abuse definitions; does not encompass institutional/vicarious claims Denied — §95.11(7) does not save the institutional/vicarious claims
Whether §95.11(9) (no time limit for sexual battery claims post‑2010) rescues time‑barred claims §95.11(9) eliminates limitations for actions related to sexual battery, potentially covering related claims against non‑perpetrators §95.11(9) is prospective and does not apply to causes of action that were already time‑barred on or before July 1, 2010 Denied — §95.11(9) does not apply because these claims were already time‑barred before July 1, 2010
Whether equitable estoppel/fraudulent concealment tolled limitations The Archdiocese/school concealed knowledge and induced plaintiff’s delay by fostering repression, so estoppel tolls the limitations period Equitable estoppel requires defendant‑induced forbearance after plaintiff knew his cause of action; no specific post‑abuse misleading acts were alleged Denied — plaintiff failed to allege defendant conduct that induced forbearance while plaintiff knew his claim

Key Cases Cited

  • Hearndon v. Graham, 767 So. 2d 1179 (Fla. 2000) (applies delayed‑discovery to childhood sexual abuse by perpetrators due to traumatic amnesia)
  • Davis v. Monahan, 832 So. 2d 708 (Fla. 2002) (limits delayed‑discovery application and notes statutory bases for delayed accrual)
  • Cisko v. Diocese of Steubenville, 123 So. 3d 83 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (construes Hearndon as limited to intentional torts against perpetrators, not institutional defendants)
  • Doe v. Sinrod, 90 So. 3d 852 (Fla. 4th DCA 2012) (section 95.11(7) applies to intentional torts by individuals and does not override other statutory limitations for claims against institutions)
  • Firestone v. Temple Beth Sholom, 183 So. 3d 1225 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (§95.11(9) does not revive claims that were already time‑barred before July 1, 2010)
  • John Doe No. 23 v. Archdiocese of Miami, Inc., 965 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007) (equitable estoppel requires allegations that defendant induced plaintiff’s forbearance while plaintiff knew his claim)
  • Rubio v. Archdiocese of Miami, Inc., 114 So. 3d 279 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (equitable estoppel standard in the context of institutional abuse claims)
Read the full case

Case Details

Case Name: W.D. v. Archdiocese of Miami, Inc. Archdiocese of Miami, a Corporation Sole Archbishop Wenski, etc.
Court Name: District Court of Appeal of Florida
Date Published: Jun 1, 2016
Citation: 197 So. 3d 584
Docket Number: 4D15-550
Court Abbreviation: Fla. Dist. Ct. App.