Vu Nguyen v. Jefferson Sessions, III
901 F.3d 1093
9th Cir.2018Background
- Nguyen, a Vietnamese national, became a lawful permanent resident in 2000 and was placed in removal proceedings in 2015 based on three misdemeanor convictions.
- He applied for cancellation of removal, which requires seven years of continuous residence and is subject to discretionary inquiry balancing adverse factors and humane considerations.
- The government invoked the "stop-time rule" (8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1)), arguing Nguyen’s 2005 admission of cocaine use was an offense "referred to" in 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) that "rendered" him inadmissible, thus ending his continuous-residence accrual at five years and rendering him ineligible for cancellation.
- The IJ pretermitted Nguyen’s cancellation application on that basis; the BIA affirmed in an unpublished decision. Nguyen petitioned for review in the Ninth Circuit.
- The Ninth Circuit evaluated whether a lawful permanent resident may be "rendered inadmissible" for stop-time purposes where the resident is not seeking admission and thus ordinarily subject only to removability grounds.
Issues
| Issue | Nguyen's Argument | Sessions' Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a lawful permanent resident is "rendered inadmissible" under the stop-time rule by committing an offense listed in § 1182(a)(2) even though the resident is not seeking admission | Nguyen: No—"inadmissible" applies only in the admission/visa context; LPRs not seeking admission cannot be "rendered inadmissible" for stop-time purposes | Sessions: Yes—commission of the offense makes the alien inadmissible if they would be inadmissible upon seeking admission, so stop-time is triggered | Held for Nguyen: LPRs not seeking admission are not "rendered inadmissible" by such offenses; stop-time did not trigger on Nguyen’s 2005 conduct |
| Whether the government’s reading (that commission alone stops time) renders statutory language superfluous | Nguyen: That reading makes the clause "that renders the alien inadmissible ... or removable" redundant and conflicts with INA structure | Sessions: Any alien who committed the offense is effectively "rendered inadmissible," so wording is not surplusage | Held for Nguyen: Government’s reading would produce surplusage; statutory text and INA context require linking "inadmissible" to seeking admission |
| Whether the statute is ambiguous and entitled to Chevron deference to the BIA | Nguyen: Statute is unambiguous under usual tools; no Chevron deference warranted | Sessions: Statute ambiguous; BIA interpretation should get deference | Held for Nguyen: No ambiguity; court declines to defer to BIA on this point |
| Whether Nguyen could alternatively have been found deportable as a drug abuser/addict stopping time | Nguyen: IJ made no findings; government conceded admitted use did not establish deportability | Sessions: BIA suggested possible deportability as drug abuser/addict | Held for Nguyen: BIA engaged in improper factfinding; no basis to stop accrual on that ground |
Key Cases Cited
- Ridore v. Holder, 696 F.3d 907 (9th Cir.) (describing discretionary balancing for cancellation of removal)
- Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018) (interpreting stop-time rule statutory language)
- Negrete-Ramirez v. Holder, 741 F.3d 1047 (9th Cir.) (standard of review for legal issue)
- Judulang v. Holder, 565 U.S. 42 (2011) (distinguishing inadmissibility and deportability and unified removal proceedings)
- Calix v. Lynch, 784 F.3d 1000 (5th Cir.) (contrasting interpretation that stop-time can be triggered for LPRs by commission alone)
- INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (declaring limits on deference where statute is unambiguous)
- Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330 (1979) (canon against rendering statutory language superfluous)