79 A.3d 743
Pa. Commw. Ct.2013Background
- On June 1, 2012 Licensee (Ketan B. Vora) crashed a vehicle, exhibited slurred speech, admitted drinking, and was arrested for DUI.
- Officers took Licensee to a hospital for blood testing; he twice declined to give a blood sample in the triage room after being read the DL-26 implied-consent form and refused to sign it.
- At the police station Licensee asked to return to the hospital to give blood; officers declined, citing the approaching two‑hour window and impracticability of obtaining a timely sample.
- PennDOT suspended Licensee’s driving privileges for one year under 75 Pa.C.S. § 1547(b) for refusal to submit to chemical testing; Licensee appealed to the trial court, which upheld the suspension after finding officers’ testimony credible and Licensee not credible.
- On appeal to this Court, Licensee argued under Section 1547(i)/(f) and relied on Commonwealth v. Barker to claim he was entitled to chemical testing (or alternate testing) because it was reasonably practicable.
- The Court affirmed: it found PennDOT met its prima facie case, Licensee failed to prove incapacity or lack of knowing refusal, Barker inapplicable, and a later assent did not vitiate an earlier refusal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Licensee knowingly refused chemical testing | Licensee claimed he was too intoxicated/confused to understand the request and DL‑26; he later asked to give blood | Officers testified Licensee was asked, understood, twice refused, and declined to sign DL‑26 | Court held refusal was knowing and conscious; trial court credibility findings upheld |
| Whether a later request to give blood vitiates an earlier refusal | Licensee argued his post‑processing request to return to hospital should allow testing | Commonwealth argued once a refusal occurs later assent does not cure it | Court held later assent does not vitiate an earlier refusal; suspension valid |
| Applicability of Barker (right to alternate testing under §1547(i)) | Licensee relied on Barker to argue officers should have permitted testing as reasonably practicable | Commonwealth distinguished Barker: there, driver requested alternative testing for a valid medical reason; here no alternative was sought or justified | Court held Barker inapplicable and Section 1547(i) did not require alternate testing in these facts |
| Whether officers were required to return Licensee to hospital after station processing | Licensee argued officers improperly refused to return him to provide blood | Commonwealth argued logistical/practicability concerns (two‑hour window, lab delay) justified refusal | Court accepted officers’ explanation that returning was not practicable and affirmed suspension |
Key Cases Cited
- McKenna v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 72 A.3d 294 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013) (later assent does not vitiate prior refusal)
- King v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 828 A.2d 1 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2003) (delayed assent still treated as refusal)
- Cunningham v. Department of Transportation, 525 A.2d 9 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987) (refusal not cured by assent minutes later)
- Commonwealth v. Barker, 70 A.3d 849 (Pa. Super. 2013) (officer must honor requested alternate test when reasonably practicable; distinguished here)
- Lanthier v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 22 A.3d 346 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2011) (elements required to sustain suspension under §1547)
- McGee v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, 803 A.2d 255 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002) (refusal affirmed where no valid medical reason for refusing breath test)
- Mooney v. Commonwealth, Department of Transportation, 654 A.2d 47 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994) (fear of needles insufficient to require alternate testing)
- Martinovic v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 881 A.2d 30 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2005) (burden on licensee to prove incapacity or lack of knowing refusal)