98 Mass. App. Ct. 535
Mass. App. Ct.2020Background
- Plaintiffs (Von Schönau‑Riedweg and Ebur Investments) sued defendants starting December 2012; extensive, multipart litigation followed.
- In June 2016 the trial judge issued a 53‑page summary judgment decision disposing of nearly all claims against the defendants.
- Remaining claims against defendant John Preston were later resolved; the plaintiffs appealed and this court largely affirmed.
- While the plaintiffs’ appeal was pending, more than a year after the June 2016 summary judgment, the defendants moved for sanctions under G. L. c. 231, § 6F, Mass. R. Civ. P. 11(a), and Mass. R. Civ. P. 56(g), supporting the motion with a 20‑page memorandum and nearly 600 pages of exhibits.
- The trial judge denied the sanctions motion principally on timeliness grounds, concluding the delay would require him to reimmerse in the prolix summary judgment record; defendants appealed the denials under rule 11(a) and rule 56(g).
- The Appeals Court affirmed, holding the judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the motions as untimely and explaining why Powell’s timeliness reasoning and rule‑of‑civil‑procedure principles support such a result.
Issues
| Issue | Von Schönau‑Riedweg (Plaintiff) Argument | Defendants' Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the trial judge abused his discretion in denying Rule 11(a) sanctions as untimely | The sanction motion was untimely and would force the judge to relitigate a massive, stale record; denial was proper | The motion was timely and narrowly focused; defendants were justified in delaying while other claims (Preston) were resolved | Affirmed: judge did not abuse discretion; courts may consider motion untimeliness under Rule 11(a) and deny when delay prejudices efficient adjudication |
| Whether Rule 56(g) permits sanctions “at any time,” so a late motion is permissible | Timeliness required; the judge reasonably denied as untimely | “At any time” means no time limit; sanctions can be sought long after summary judgment | Affirmed: “at any time” does not authorize unconstrained delay; judge within discretion to deny as untimely |
| Whether Powell v. Stevens (§6F) timeliness rationale extends to Rule 11(a) and Rule 56(g) | Powell’s prompt‑hearing rationale applies to analogous procedural rules | Powell is limited to §6F and should not control Rule 11/56(g) | Held Powell’s reasoning about promptness is persuasive and applicable to delays under Rule 11 and Rule 56(g) in these circumstances |
| Whether defendants preserved or adequately presented Rule 56(g) arguments below | Plaintiffs argued many Rule 56(g) theories were not raised below and relief was not requested at summary judgment | Defendants relied on prior motions to strike and claimed they preserved issues | Held: many Rule 56(g) theories were not presented to the judge; motions to strike did not request Rule 56(g) sanctions or a finding of bad faith, so the court could decline to address them on appeal |
Key Cases Cited
- Powell v. Stevens, 69 Mass. App. Ct. 87 (2007) (affirming denial of § 6F sanctions as untimely; courts may require prompt § 6F hearings)
- Van Christo Advertising, Inc. v. M/A‑COM/LCS, 426 Mass. 410 (1998) (Rule 11 sanctions reviewed for abuse of discretion)
- LoCicero v. Hartford Ins. Group, 25 Mass. App. Ct. 339 (1988) (untimeliness and court‑efficiency are permissible considerations when addressing Rule 11 motions)
- Von Schönau‑Riedweg v. Rothschild Bank AG, 95 Mass. App. Ct. 471 (2019) (underlying appeal affirming most of summary judgment and describing the voluminous record and trial court ruling)
- Psy‑Ed Corp. v. Klein, 459 Mass. 697 (2011) (complex cases may require evidentiary hearings and detailed findings before awarding sanctions)
- Vaught Constr. Corp. v. Bertonazzi Buick Co., 371 Mass. 553 (1976) (discussion of Rule 56(g) remedies)
- Cahaly v. Benistar Prop. Exch. Trust Co., 85 Mass. App. Ct. 418 (2014) (example of an extensive evidentiary hearing and factual findings on sanctions in a long‑running dispute)