656 F.Supp.3d 431
S.D.N.Y.2023Background
- Plaintiffs (Volokh, Rumble, Locals) operate online speech platforms and say they fall within New York’s definition of a “social media network.”
- In response to the Buffalo racially motivated livestreamed mass shooting and related online dissemination, New York enacted N.Y. Gen. Bus. Law § 394-ccc (the “Hateful Conduct Law”).
- The law requires covered platforms to (1) provide an easily accessible user complaint mechanism for “hateful conduct” and (2) publish a clear policy explaining how the platform will respond to such complaints; civil penalties may follow for knowing noncompliance.
- Plaintiffs, which describe themselves as having pro–free speech moderation philosophies, challenged the law (facial and as-applied) under the First Amendment and asserted Section 230 preemption, and moved for a preliminary injunction.
- The district court concluded the law compels and constrains protected speech, is content- and viewpoint-based, is not narrowly tailored to the asserted interests, is overbroad and vague, but is not preempted by Section 230; it granted a preliminary injunction barring enforcement.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the law compels speech by forcing platforms to adopt/state a definition and policy on “hateful conduct” | Law forces platforms to speak and adopt the State’s definition of hateful conduct, altering editorial judgment | Law merely requires a reporting mechanism and optional response capability; it regulates conduct not speech | Court: Requirement to publish a policy compels speech and alters platforms’ editorial choices; likely unconstitutional as applied |
| Whether the requirement is commercial speech (lower scrutiny) | Platforms’ policy requirement is not commercial speech—it’s expressive and tied to protected content | Requirement is a factual disclosure akin to mandated commercial disclosures; so subject to lesser scrutiny | Court: Not commercial speech; it is expressive and implicates protected speech, so higher scrutiny applies |
| Whether the law survives strict scrutiny (narrow tailoring/compelling interest), including incitement carve-out | State interest in preventing mass-shootings is compelling, but law is not narrowly tailored to that aim | Law targets incitement and hateful conduct tied to violence; State’s interest justified | Court: Preventing violence is compelling but the law is not narrowly tailored (it reaches vast protected speech beyond true incitement) |
| Facial overbreadth and vagueness | Statute chills a substantial amount of protected speech and uses indefinite terms (e.g., “vilify,” “humiliate”) causing chill | Terms are ordinary and understandable; plaintiffs have not shown substantial chill | Court: Plaintiffs likely to succeed on facial overbreadth and vagueness; law chills protected speech and is indefinite |
| Whether § 230 preempts the law | Law conflicts with § 230 by imposing liability for publisher decisions and policing content | Law regulates procedural obligations (reporting mechanism and disclosure), not publisher liability for user content; therefore consistent with § 230 | Court: § 230 does not preempt the statute as written because it does not treat platforms as publishers of third‑party content |
Key Cases Cited
- Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744 (2017) (First Amendment protects offensive and hateful speech)
- R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn., 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (government may not impose content- or viewpoint-based restrictions on speech)
- Reed v. Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 576 U.S. 155 (2015) (content-based regulations trigger strict scrutiny)
- Nat’l Inst. of Fam. & Life Advocs. v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018) (compelled disclosures that force advocacy are subject to heightened scrutiny)
- Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N. Carolina, Inc., 487 U.S. 781 (1988) (compelled speech doctrine and analysis of compelled disclosures)
- Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1 (1986) (forcing a speaker to carry a message with which it disagrees violates the First Amendment)
- Evergreen Ass’n, Inc. v. City of New York, 740 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2014) (compelled disclosures burden protected expressive activity)
- NetChoice, LLC v. Att’y Gen., Fla., 34 F.4th 1196 (11th Cir. 2022) (platforms’ editorial choices are protected by the First Amendment)
- New York State Restaurant Ass’n v. New York City Bd. of Health, 556 F.3d 114 (2d Cir. 2009) (distinguishing mandated factual commercial disclosures)
- Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (identifies unprotected categories such as fighting words)
- Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (incitement requires intent and likelihood of imminent lawless action)
