Volkswagen Group of America, Inc. And Audi of America, Inc. v. John Walker III, in His Official Capacity as Chairman of the Texas Department of Motor Vehicles Board The Honorable Michael J. O'Malley, the Honorable Penny A. Wilkov, in Their Official Capacities as Administrative Law Judges for the State Office
03-15-00285-CV
Tex. App.Jun 26, 2015Background
- In Dec. 2012 Budget Leasing agreed to sell franchised Audi/Porsche/Maserati dealerships to Weitz; Audi refused to approve the transfer and Budget/Weitz filed a protest with the Texas Motor Vehicle Board (Board). The Board referred the matter to SOAH for a contested-case hearing.
- After SOAH ALJs issued a proposal for decision, the Board on Feb. 13, 2015 remanded the protest to SOAH for expedited consideration; ALJs scheduled and conducted remand proceedings, including discovery and a two-day hearing in April 2015.
- Audi filed suit in Travis County alleging ultra vires acts by the Board Chairman and the ALJs and sought injunctive relief to halt the remand; a TRO was denied, and on April 30, 2015 the district court granted pleas to the jurisdiction and dismissed Audi's claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, rendering the temporary-injunction motion moot.
- Audi appealed the dismissal to the Third Court of Appeals and later filed a "Motion for Temporary Relief to Protect the Court's Jurisdiction," effectively seeking an injunction to halt further administrative proceedings; Intervenors (buyers) opposed the motion.
- Intervenors argue the appeal is from a final judgment (not interlocutory), Audi improperly seeks injunctive relief without complying with Rule 52 (original proceeding requirements), the injunction is unnecessary because Audi has adequate administrative and judicial remedies, Audi's requested relief is speculative as remand may not moot the appeal, and Audi's delays and omissions justify denial and possible sanctions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Tex. R. App. P. 29.3 or 46.3 authorizes the requested temporary relief | Audi contends the court may issue orders to preserve jurisdiction under Rule 29.3 (and invokes 46.3) | Intervenors respond the district court orders are final judgments, not interlocutory, so Rule 29.3 does not apply; 46.3 is not a vehicle for injunctions | Motion should be denied because appeal is from a final judgment; Rule 29.3 inapplicable and Rule 46.3 not a basis for injunctive relief |
| Whether Audi may obtain an injunction from the appellate court without commencing an original proceeding under Rule 52 | Audi styled its filing as temporary relief in the appeal | Intervenors argue substantive relief sought is an injunction and Audi failed to file a Rule 52 original proceeding or satisfy its content/party-naming requirements (e.g., Board omitted) | Motion defective: injunction relief must be sought via Rule 52-compliant original proceeding; Audi failed to comply |
| Whether injunction is necessary to preserve subject matter of the appeal (mootness risk) | Audi asserts remand might conclude before appeal is resolved, risking mootness | Intervenors argue Audi has adequate administrative and judicial remedies (Board arguments, judicial review under Gov't Code chapter 2001), and the possibility of mootness is speculative; injunction would prematurely decide merits | No injunctive relief warranted: mootness concern speculative and injunction would improperly decide merits and disrupt statutory administrative process |
| Whether Audi's delays and omissions (and conduct) bar equitable relief and warrant sanctions | Audi emphasizes urgency to protect appeal | Intervenors point to multiple, unexplained delays, prior representations that no extraordinary relief would be sought, failure to name real parties, and prejudice from delays; seek costs and sanctions under Tex. R. App. P. 52.11 | Intervenors argue delay and procedural failings undercut Audi's entitlement to equity and support denial and possible sanctions |
Key Cases Cited
- Ammex Warehouse Co. v. Archer, 381 S.W.2d 478 (Tex. 1964) (specifically rejects issuing injunctive relief on speculative risk that subject matter of appeal will be destroyed)
- Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191 (Tex. 2001) (finality: a judgment disposing of all parties and claims is final regardless of language)
- Holloway v. Fifth Court of Appeals, 767 S.W.2d 680 (Tex. 1989) (extraordinary writs are not authorized when adequate remedy by appeal exists)
- Winfield v. Renfro, 792 S.W.2d 524 (Tex. App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1990) (interlocutory order defined as one made pending final disposition)
- Collier v. Central Nat'l Bank, 564 S.W.2d 828 (Tex. Civ. App. — Austin 1978) (example of appellate injunctive relief to prevent disposition of property that would render appeal moot)