Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill
139 S. Ct. 1945
| SCOTUS | 2019Background
- After the 2010 census Virginia redrew state legislative districts; voters in 12 House districts sued, alleging racial gerrymandering violating the Equal Protection Clause.
- The Virginia House of Delegates (the House) intervened as a defendant and defended the enacted House map through two bench trials; a three-judge district court found 11 districts unconstitutional and enjoined elections in those districts until a new plan was adopted.
- Virginia’s Attorney General announced the Commonwealth would not appeal to the Supreme Court; the House alone filed the appeal to the Supreme Court.
- The State Defendants moved to dismiss the House’s appeal for lack of Article III standing; the Supreme Court considered whether the House could (a) represent the State or (b) have its own institutional standing.
- The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding the House lacked authority to represent the State and lacked cognizable injury in its own right.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (House) | Defendant's Argument (State Defs) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the House may represent Virginia on appeal | State may designate agents; the House had functionally defended the map and so can represent State interests | Virginia law vests exclusive authority to represent the Commonwealth in civil matters in the Attorney General; State did not authorize House to act as agent | No — House lacked authority to displace the Attorney General and thus could not represent the State |
| Whether the House has Article III standing as an institution | The House (a chamber) has a concrete institutional injury: invalidation of its enacted plan and a judicial map will change its membership, constituencies, and legislative output | One chamber of a bicameral legislature lacks a judicially cognizable institutional injury from altered district lines; any harms are to individual members or to the General Assembly as a whole | No — a single House has no cognizable injury from judicial invalidation of a law enacted by the legislature and thus lacked standing to appeal |
| Whether precedent (e.g., Karcher, Beens, Coleman, Arizona State Legislature) supports House standing | Relies on Beens and Coleman to show legislative bodies/members can have standing; analogizes to cases recognizing institutional interests | Distinguishes Arizona State Legislature (whole legislature vs. single chamber) and Coleman (challenges to vote counting), and limits Beens to different facts (structural change to chamber) | No — precedents do not authorize one chamber to pursue appeal here; Arizona State Legislature and Beens are distinguishable |
| Whether standing can be forfeited or created by intervenor status | House argued prior participation and state-court permissive intervention (e.g., Vesilind) show authority/standing | Standing is a nonwaivable jurisdictional requirement; intervenor status at trial does not supply Article III standing to appeal when primary party will not appeal | No — intervenor status or past participation does not cure lack of standing on appeal |
Key Cases Cited
- Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (2013) (standing must be demonstrated at every stage; State may designate agents to represent it)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (three elements of Article III standing)
- Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43 (1997) (standing must persist through all litigation stages, including appeal)
- Diamond v. Charles, 476 U.S. 54 (1986) (intervenor status does not automatically confer standing to appeal)
- Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72 (1987) (state-legislative bodies may sometimes represent state interests under state law; decision turned on state-law authorization)
- Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997) (members of a legislature lacked standing to assert institutional injuries absent a discrete, personal injury)
- Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939) (legislators who would have affected a specific legislative outcome may have standing in limited contexts)
- Sixty-seventh Minnesota State Senate v. Beens, 406 U.S. 187 (1972) (per curiam) (allowed legislative body to challenge a court order that substantially altered chamber size)