Virginia E. Alldredge and Julia A. Luker, as Co-Personal Representatives of the Estate of Venita Hargis v. The Good Samaritan Home, Inc.
982 N.E.2d 378
Ind. Ct. App.2013Background
- Plaintiffs Virginia E. Alldredge and Julia A. Luker, as co-personal representatives of the Estate of Venita Hargis, filed a wrongful death action against Good Samaritan more than two years after learning the true cause of death.
- WDA requires filing within two years of death by wrongful act, with tolling potential.
- Trial court treated WDA deadline as a condition precedent, applying a “reasonable time” standard after discovery under fraudulent concealment.
- Plaintiffs argued the Fraudulent Concealment Statute should apply to restart a full two-year period after discovery.
- Indiana Supreme Court-law recognized tolling for fraudulent concealment but adopted a two-year-from-discovery-or-discovery-of-concealing-facts rule, not a simple “reasonable time” rule.
- Court remanded for continuation of underlying litigation with the tolling rule clarified.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether fraud concealment tolls the WDA deadline | Alldredge contends tolling applies to restart two-year limit | Good Samaritan argues WDA is a non-claim statute not tolled | Yes, tolling applies |
| What is the new filing period after concealment is discovered | Two years from discovery of concealment | Two years from discovery with reasonable diligence? | Two years from discovery or from discovery of facts that should lead to discovery, whichever is lesser |
| Constitutional/equal protection concerns with tolling | Reasonable-time standard unconstitutional; need uniform standard | No constitutional violation if statute interpreted to avoid absurd results | No constitutional violation; tolling compatibles with equal protection and due process |
Key Cases Cited
- Glus v. Brooklyn Eastern District Terminal, 359 U.S. 231 (Supreme Court 1959) (no man may take advantage of his own wrong; tolling principles)
- Southerland v. Hammond, 693 N.E.2d 74 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990) (WDA two-year period is a condition precedent, non-claim statute)
- Robertson v. Gene B. Glick Co., 960 N.E.2d 179 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011) (reiterates non-claim/statute interpretation of WDA)
- Newkirk v. Bethlehem Woods Nursing & Rehabilitation Center, LLC, 898 N.E.2d 299 (Ind. 2008) (Supreme Court recognized longer period for latent claims in certain contexts)
- Technisand, Inc. v. Melton, 898 N.E.2d 303 (Ind. 2008) (statutory interpretation; latency considerations)
- Van Dusen v. Stotts, 712 N.E.2d 491 (Ind. 1999) (latency cases extend time where discovery is delayed by condition)
- Martin v. Richey, 711 N.E.2d 1273 (Ind. 1999) (constitutionality considerations in long-latency medical contexts)
- City of Vincennes v. Emmons, 841 N.E.2d 155 (Ind. 2006) (statutory interpretation to avoid constitutional issues)