Virginia C. Bryant v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.), 17A03-1605-CR-1151

On January 22, 2015, an antique store with an attached residence owned/used by Virginia C. Bryant burned; firefighters treated the blaze defensively and one firefighter (Michael Long) suffered smoke inhalation and ER treatment.
Fire investigator found multiple unconnected points of origin, gasoline/kerosene containers, and odors consistent with accelerant; concluded the fire was intentionally set.
The building’s antique inventory (subject to a divorce-court-ordered auction splitting proceeds with Bryant’s ex-husband) was destroyed; estimated auction revenue had been significant.
Bryant made several post-fire statements (including telling an auctioneer to check insurance and that she was not required to insure under the decree); she also had a later roadside encounter with Detective Ben Rice and later spoke with him at the sheriff’s office.
The State charged Bryant with Level 3 felony arson; at trial the court summarized the State’s theory during voir dire and read the charging information (including language that Detective Rice “states and verifies”) in a preliminary instruction; Bryant did not object at trial and was convicted and sentenced to four years executed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether trial court’s voir dire statements misstated facts and usurped the jury’s role	Court may inform jurors of the nature of the allegations	Bryant: court presented elements as established facts, invading jury province and denying due process	No fundamental error; statements framed as what the State alleged and did not render a fair trial impossible
Whether reading the charging information (including that Detective Rice “states and verifies”) in a preliminary instruction deprived Bryant of presumption of innocence	Reading the information is routine and permitted as part of preliminary instructions	Bryant: language suggested verification by police amounted to guilt, invading the jury’s role and violating due process	No fundamental error; other instructions repeatedly preserved presumption of innocence and burden of proof; looked at instructions as whole

Gibson v. State, 43 N.E.3d 231 (2015) (trial courts have broad discretion in regulating voir dire)
Albores v. State, 987 N.E.2d 98 (2013) (manner of instructing a jury is left to court’s discretion)
McKinley v. State, 45 N.E.3d 25 (2015) (contemporaneous objection usually required; fundamental-error standard narrow)
Rosales v. State, 23 N.E.3d 8 (2015) (appellate reversal without contemporaneous objection only for fundamental error)
Hopkins v. State, 759 N.E.2d 633 (2001) (definition and application of fundamental error doctrine)
White v. State, 846 N.E.2d 1026 (2006) (error must render a fair trial impossible to be fundamental)
Lynn v. State, 60 N.E.3d 1135 (2016) (disapproving affirmation-type language in preliminary instructions as poor practice, but not necessarily fundamental error when other instructions preserve rights)