Virgin Islands Port Authority v. United States, 922 F.3d 1328

VIPA is the Virgin Islands Port Authority, empowered by local law to set and collect wharfage and tonnage fees; Customs historically collected those fees and remitted net proceeds to the Virgin Islands/VIPA.
Customs collected the disputed fees from 1969 until March 1, 2011, deducting collection costs; authority to collect after 1994 was tied to a 1994 Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between Customs and the Virgin Islands that cited 48 U.S.C. § 1469c.
VIPA amended its Marine Tariff Schedule in 2006 to remove instructions to pay Customs; in 2007 VIPA (with the governor’s approval) sent a letter asking Customs to let VIPA collect the fees, but did not invoke the MOA’s express 180‑day revocation procedure.
Customs continued collecting through early 2011; VIPA began collecting on March 1, 2011, and later sued to recover about $10 million collected by Customs from February 2008 to March 1, 2011, alleging an illegal exaction.
The Claims Court granted summary judgment to the United States; the Federal Circuit affirmed, holding Customs was authorized under § 1469c together with the 1994 MOA to collect the fees and that VIPA did not effectively revoke that authority during the relevant period.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Customs’ collection from Feb 2008–Mar 1, 2011 was an illegal exaction	VIPA: Customs lacked authorization after VIPA revoked or amended authorization in 2007 and thus unlawfully collected fees	U.S.: Customs was authorized under §1469c and the 1994 MOA; no illegal exaction	Held for U.S.: No illegal exaction because Customs had authorization during period
Whether the 1994 MOA provided authority to collect and retain fees	VIPA: MOA cannot be the source because Customs collected pre‑1994 and VIPA’s tariff governs	U.S.: MOA expressly identified reimbursable activities including collecting tonnage/wharfage and cited §1469c	Held for U.S.: MOA authorizes Customs to collect and retain reimbursements
Whether VIPA’s 2006 tariff amendment revoked Customs’ authority	VIPA: Removing payment instructions signaled revocation	U.S.: Amendment was equivocal and insufficient to revoke MOA authority	Held for U.S.: 2006 change did not reasonably indicate revocation
Whether VIPA’s 2007 letter revoked the MOA authority	VIPA: 2007 letter (and governor’s approval) revoked Customs’ authority	U.S.: Letter was a request to transfer collection, not an invocation of MOA’s revocation clause	Held for U.S.: 2007 letter did not effect revocation under agency law or the MOA’s procedures

Eastport S.S. Corp. v. United States, 372 F.2d 1002 (Ct. Cl. 1967) (definition and recovery rules for illegal exaction)
Aerolineas Argentinas v. United States, 77 F.3d 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (illegal‑exaction doctrine and when payments “in effect” may be recovered)
Camellia Apartments, Inc. v. United States, 334 F.2d 667 (Ct. Cl. 1964) (discusses limits on illegal‑exaction recovery where government did not directly receive funds)
Fed. Election Comm’n v. NRA Political Victory Fund, 513 U.S. 88 (1994) (principles of agency law govern questions of authority)
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. United States, 271 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (use of Restatements in interpreting common‑law agency principles)
Gov’t Guarantee Fund of Republic of Finland v. Hyatt Corp., 95 F.3d 291 (3d Cir. 1996) (distinguishing clear termination language as effecting revocation)
Dimare Fresh, Inc. v. United States, 808 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (errors of government claim of right are not coercive without coercive government action)