Vincent Wrencher, Sr. v. State
03-15-00438-CV
Tex. App.—WacoNov 30, 2015Background
- Owner Vincent Wrencher sought review after an administrative hearing (Mar. 19/28, 2014) in which Hearing Officer Brad Norton determined Wrencher's dog "Skip" was a "dangerous dog" under Texas Health & Safety Code ch. 822 based on an alleged unprovoked bite on or about Sept. 15, 2013.
- The administrative hearing included testimony about a prior, dismissed City vicious-dog complaint (an incident between Skip and the neighbor’s dog); Wrencher contends the hearing officer granted but then violated his oral Motion in Limine and admitted that prior-incident evidence.
- The municipal court (May 9, 2014) affirmed the administrative determination that Skip is a dangerous dog and ordered compliance with ch. 822 requirements.
- Wrencher filed for further relief; Travis County Court No. 8 held an ex parte hearing (June 12, 2015) and dismissed for want of jurisdiction / failure to comply with appellate procedure, which Wrencher appeals to the Third Court of Appeals.
- Core contested factual/legal points: (1) whether the admitted prior-vicious-dog evidence was admissible and prejudicial; (2) whether the evidence presented at the administrative hearing sufficed to prove the statutory elements of a "dangerous dog" (including the enclosure/escape element); and (3) whether delay (laches) and witness credibility undermined the administrative finding.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Wrencher) | Defendant's Argument (City/Valle) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of prior dismissed vicious-dog evidence | Hearing officer granted Motion in Limine but nevertheless allowed testimony/evidence about a prior dismissed vicious-dog incident; that evidence was irrelevant and prejudicial and requires a new hearing excluding it | City presented the witness testimony and physical evidence as relevant to pattern/behavior; hearing officer permitted it | Hearing officer allowed the prior-incident evidence at the administrative hearing; municipal court affirmed the resulting determination (appellant argues this was reversible error) |
| Sufficiency of evidence to meet ch. 822 elements (unprovoked attack causing bodily injury outside secure enclosure) | Wrencher: no proof Skip left a secure enclosure, no photographic/medical evidence of injury, key elements of §822.041(2) not proven, so determination lacks legal support | City: testimony (Mr. Valle) described an unprovoked bite/abrasion off the owner’s property (Sept. 15, 2013), plus later aggressive act toward Valle’s dog; hearing officer found testimony sufficient | Hearing officer found testimony sufficient to satisfy §822.041(2); municipal court found substantial evidence supporting that finding |
| Laches / delay in reporting the alleged bite | Wrencher: allegation surfaced only after a prior vicious-dog complaint was dismissed and was reported many months after the alleged Sept. 2013 incident, prejudicing defense and evidentiary collection | City: incident occurred mid-September 2013 (within typical civil limitation windows); no statutory bar to adjudicating dangerous-dog determinations; delay not fatal | Hearing officer rejected laches as a bar (found incident occurred ~Sept. 2013 and was timely for administrative determination) |
| Jurisdiction / appealability after municipal court | Wrencher: county court erred by conducting ex parte proceedings and dismissing his motion/new-trial request without proper notice; he seeks appellate review to remand for a proper hearing | State/County: Travis County Court held dismissal for want of jurisdiction and failure to comply with appellate rules; municipal-court dangerous-dog appeals to justice/county/municipal court are limited by statute and procedure cited by county | County Court No. 8 dismissed the further proceeding for want of jurisdiction / procedural noncompliance; Wrencher has appealed that dismissal to the Third Court of Appeals |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Vest, 116 F.3d 1179 (7th Cir. 1997) (admitting prejudicial evidence despite prior limiting order can be reversible error)
- Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191 (Tex. 2001) (finality and appealability principles for administrative/agency orders)