184 A.3d 1113
R.I.2018Background
- Coccoli (pro se) sought to redevelop Hope Mill in Scituate; the Zoning Board conditionally approved the project contingent on sewer-connection approvals.
- The Town Council voted (April 12, 2007) to approve a 40,000-gpd sewer allocation contingent on receipt of an MOU from Hope Mill Village Associates (HMVA).
- An MOU was thereafter drafted on town solicitor letterhead, signed by the town council president and Coccoli, sealed, notarized, recorded, and obligated Coccoli to design and construct a sewer line in exchange for sewer capacity.
- Coccoli spent roughly $2 million on infrastructure/engineering work; the property later entered bankruptcy and receivership, and multiple purchase-and-sale attempts by Coccoli were terminated.
- Coccoli sued the Town and several individuals alleging: (I) breach of the MOU (contract/promissory estoppel), (II) violation of the Privacy Act, (III) tortious interference with a purchase-and-sale agreement, and (IV) fraudulent misrepresentation. The Superior Court granted summary judgment to defendants on all counts. Coccoli appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Enforceability of the MOU / breach of contract | Coccoli: Council vote + executed/recorded MOU created a binding contract; he performed (spent $2M). | Town: MOU was not approved by a subsequent council vote, contained no terms, and thus is not binding. | Vacated Superior Court on Count I — court finds a contract was formed: conditional vote + executed/recorded MOU + partial performance establish enforceability. |
| 2) Claim under the Privacy Act (federal) | Coccoli: Town released confidential proprietary materials; Privacy Act protects him. | Town: Privacy Act applies only to federal agencies, not a municipal town. | Affirmed dismissal of Count II — Privacy Act does not apply to state or local entities. |
| 3) Tortious interference with plaintiff’s purchase-and-sale | Coccoli: Town actions and closed meetings discouraged investors and interfered with his contract with the receiver. | Town: No evidence defendants knew of the contract, intentionally interfered, or caused damages; no obligation to grant tax-stabilization. | Affirmed dismissal of Count III — plaintiff failed to show knowledge, intent, or damages from interference. |
| 4) Fraudulent misrepresentation | Coccoli: Town (or agents) made representations causing him to incur cleanup costs; DEM application signature implied town approval. | Town: No town representative made the alleged representations; the signature was by a nonmunicipal fire chief and DEM form disclaimed town approval. | Affirmed dismissal of Count IV — no evidence of town-made misrepresentation or detrimental reliance. |
Key Cases Cited
- Sullo v. Greenberg, 68 A.3d 404 (R.I. 2013) (summary-judgment standard review de novo)
- Sacco v. Cranston School Department, 53 A.3d 147 (R.I. 2012) (summary-judgment principles)
- Key v. Brown University, 163 A.3d 1162 (R.I. 2017) (summary judgment appropriate where no material fact disputes)
- Delta Airlines, Inc. v. Neary, 785 A.2d 1123 (R.I. 2001) (summary-judgment standard)
- Fogarty v. Palumbo, 163 A.3d 526 (R.I. 2017) (elements for tortious interference)
- Nonnenmacher v. City of Warwick, 722 A.2d 1199 (R.I. 1999) (contract existence is a question of law reviewed de novo)
- Rhode Island Five v. Medical Associates of Bristol County, Inc., 668 A.2d 1250 (R.I. 1996) (essential elements of a contract)
- Richard v. Richard, 900 A.2d 1170 (R.I. 2006) (partial performance can evidence an oral agreement)
- Burch v. Pioneer Credit Recovery, Inc., 551 F.3d 122 (2d Cir. 2008) (Privacy Act applies only to federal agencies)
- Unt v. Aerospace Corp., 765 F.2d 1440 (9th Cir. 1985) (Privacy Act remedies do not apply to state/local actors or private parties)
- Belliveau Building Corp. v. O’Coin, 763 A.2d 622 (R.I. 2000) (elements required for tortious interference)
- Asermely v. Allstate Insurance Co., 728 A.2d 461 (R.I. 1999) (requirements for fraudulent misrepresentation)