Vincent Damon Ditirro v. Matthew J. Sando, 2022 COA 94

In 2020 Colorado enacted §13-21-131 creating a private cause of action against "peace officers" who, under color of law, deprive persons of rights secured by the Colorado Bill of Rights and permitting employer indemnification in certain circumstances (§13-21-131(4)).
On August 7, 2018, CSP troopers Sando and Simon stopped and arrested Ditirro; he alleged they assaulted him and sued the troopers, CSP, Commerce City Police Department, and Adams County Sheriff’s Office under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and §13-21-131.
Ditirro amended to remove his §1983 claims while the case was in federal court; the case was remanded to state court and refiled under state-law claims only (five claims under §13-21-131, including an indemnification-based claim against employers).
Adams County and Commerce City moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim; the district court concluded §13-21-131 creates claims only against individual peace officers and dismissed the employers’ claims; it also denied Ditirro leave to reassert §1983 claims as untimely/dilatory.
On appeal the Court of Appeals affirmed: §13-21-131 does not authorize a direct action against a peace officer’s employer (as pleaded), the denial of leave to amend was not an abuse of discretion, and appellees are entitled to appellate attorney fees under the then-applicable §13-17-201.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether §13-21-131 authorizes a direct cause of action against a peace officer’s employer	Ditirro: statute (esp. indemnification language) supports claims against employers	Defendants: statute names and creates liability only against individual peace officers; indemnification benefits officers, not a direct employer liability	Held: statute grants claims only against individual officers; no direct action against employer under these facts
Effect and scope of §13-21-131(4) indemnification	Ditirro: indemnification provision implies plaintiff can sue employer	Defendants: indemnification is for officers (like insurance), not a third-party direct-action right	Held: indemnification applies to officer’s remedy against employer; does not create a direct plaintiff claim pre-judgment under these facts
Denial of leave to amend to reassert §1983 claims	Ditirro: should be allowed to amend to reassert federal claims	Defendants: reassertion was dilatory and sought to manipulate jurisdiction	Held: district court did not abuse discretion; amendment permissibly denied for delay/dilatory motive
Entitlement to appellate attorney fees under §13-17-201	Ditirro: (implicitly) fees not warranted	Defendants: dismissal under C.R.C.P. 12(b) mandates fee award under statute	Held: defendants awarded appellate attorney fees and Commerce City awarded appeal costs under the version of §13-17-201 in effect at the time

Norton v. Rocky Mountain Planned Parenthood, 409 P.3d 331 (Colo. 2018) (standard for reviewing 12(b) dismissal and accepting pleaded facts)
Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Equalization v. Gerganoff, 241 P.3d 932 (Colo. 2010) (statutory interpretation principles: ascertain legislative intent from text)
Warne v. Hall, 373 P.3d 588 (Colo. 2016) (pleading plausibility standard for agency/employer allegations)
All Around Transport, Inc. v. Continental Western Ins. Co., 931 P.2d 552 (Colo. App. 1996) (injured claimant generally cannot maintain direct action on insurer/indemnitor contract)
Wark v. Board of County Commissioners, 47 P.3d 711 (Colo. App. 2002) (mandatory attorney-fee award when action dismissed under C.R.C.P. 12(b))
Rea v. Correctional Corp. of America, 272 P.3d 1143 (Colo. App. 2012) (appealability: unserved defendants not litigants for final-judgment rule)
Musick v. Woznicki, 136 P.3d 244 (Colo. 2006) (when final judgment occurs as to served defendants and appealability concerns)