Vince v. Koontz, 213 So. 3d 448

On Nov. 11, 2012 Jonathan Vince, driving a pickup northbound on U.S. Hwy 61, struck a GMC Yukon Denali towing a boat driven by Dale Koontz after the Denali pulled onto the highway from a stop sign at a boat launch. Vince sought damages for personal injuries; his wife asserted loss of consortium.
Koontz and his insurer, State Farm, denied liability and alleged Vince’s sole or contributory negligence; Koontz filed a reconventional demand against Vince.
At a June 2014 jury trial, the jury found Koontz negligent (Q1: Yes) but answered that his negligence was not a proximate cause of the accident (Q2: No) and left subsequent questions unanswered; the court entered judgment dismissing the Vinces’ claims.
The Vinces moved for JNOV or a new trial arguing the verdict form/instructions improperly allowed the jury to find negligence but not causation; the trial court granted a new trial, but this court later vacated that order and reinstated the June 26, 2014 judgment; after procedural steps the court designated the judgment final and this appeal followed.
Factual dispute at trial centered on whether Vince was distracted/excessively speeding (defense expert) or lacked time/distance to avoid the collision due to Koontz entering the highway (plaintiffs’ expert). Physical evidence and testimony provided support for both views.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the jury’s finding that Koontz’s negligence was not a proximate cause (Q2: No) is manifestly erroneous	Vince: finding negligence requires finding causation; jury’s Q2 answer is legally wrong and mandates damages	Koontz/State Farm: jury could find negligence but conclude Koontz’s conduct was not cause-in-fact; evidence supports that Vince had time to stop	Court: affirmed — jury’s “proximate cause” answer reflected a factual finding of no cause-in-fact; record supports it and it is not manifestly erroneous
Whether jury instructions/definition of “proximate cause” were erroneous and prejudicial	Vince: instructions and verdict form confused jurors and omitted legal proximate-cause element, warranting new trial/JNOV	Koontz: definition used corresponds to common formulations and parties did not object at trial; jury received adequate factual causation instruction	Court: instruction mislabelled cause-in-fact as proximate cause and omitted legal proximate-cause discussion, but error did not prevent jury from dispensing justice given factual nature of the dispute; no reversal

Rando v. Anco Insulations Inc., 16 So.3d 1065 (La. 2009) (articulates five negligence elements and distinguishes cause-in-fact from proximate cause)
Roberts v. Benoit, 605 So.2d 1032 (La. 1992) (explains cause-in-fact as a factual "but for" or substantial-factor inquiry)
Dixie Drive It Yourself Sys. New Orleans Co. v. Am. Beverage Co., 137 So.2d 298 (La. 1962) (discusses the nebulous use of "proximate cause" and scope-of-liability considerations)
Stobart v. State, DOTD, 617 So.2d 880 (La. 1993) (describes appellate review deference where two permissible views of evidence exist)
Adams v. Rhodia, Inc., 988 So.2d 798 (La. 2008) (addresses standard for reviewing erroneous jury instructions and when reversal is required)
Chatman v. S. Univ. at New Orleans, 197 So.3d 366 (La. App. 4 Cir. 2016) (example of trial court instructing jury on the legal proximate-cause element)
Wegener v. Lafayette Ins. Co., 60 So.3d 1220 (La. 2011) (explains that plain and fundamental jury-charge errors may be reviewed despite failure to object)