Vijayakumar Thuraissigiam v. Usdhs, 917 F.3d 1097

Background

Thuraissigiam, a Sri Lankan national, was apprehended about 25 yards north of the U.S.–Mexico border and placed in expedited removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). He indicated fear of persecution, received a credible-fear interview, was found not to have a credible fear, and an IJ summarily affirmed.
He filed a habeas petition under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e)(2) challenging the procedures and legal standards used in his credible-fear screening and IJ review, alleging statutory, regulatory, and due process violations.
The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction under § 1252(e), and rejected his Suspension Clause challenge; Thuraissigiam appealed and obtained a stay of removal.
Section 1252(e)(2) narrowly authorizes district-court habeas to contest only three factual determinations (alienage, whether an expedited removal order was issued and relates to the petitioner, and LPR/refugee/asylee status), and § 1252(a)(2)(A)(iii) bars other judicial review of expedited removal decisions.
The Ninth Circuit panel held § 1252(e)(2) does not provide statutory jurisdiction for Thuraissigiam’s procedural and legal claims, but concluded the Suspension Clause requires more habeas review than § 1252(e)(2) affords as applied to him.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether § 1252(e)(2) authorizes district-court habeas review of Thuraissigiam’s procedural, statutory, and constitutional challenges to his credible-fear screening	§ 1252(e)(2)(B) permits review of the legal and procedural defects that infected his expedited removal	§ 1252(e)(2) is cabined to three factual determinations and bars review of procedural or legal challenges	Court: § 1252(e)(2) does not authorize jurisdiction over these claims (no statutory habeas relief on procedural/legal grounds)
Whether Thuraissigiam may invoke the Suspension Clause	He is detained in the U.S. and may invoke the Suspension Clause to test legality of executive detention	Government: arriving noncitizens like him lack Suspension Clause protection (or lack due process rights that the Clause would protect)	Court: He may invoke the Suspension Clause (finality-era and common-law history support availability)
Whether § 1252(e)(2) (as applied) satisfies the Suspension Clause (i.e., provides a meaningful substitute for habeas)	The statute’s narrow review forecloses meaningful review of whether detention rests on erroneous interpretation/application of law	The limited, expedited-review scheme is adequate and consistent with plenary immigration power	Court: § 1252(e)(2) fails the Suspension Clause as applied — it does not provide a meaningful opportunity to show detention rests on legal error
Whether the canon of constitutional avoidance allows reading § 1252(e)(2) to permit broader review to avoid constitutional infirmity	The statute can be construed to allow the necessary habeas review	Government: the statute’s text is unambiguous and bars such a reading	Court: Canon cannot rescue § 1252(e)(2) here; statute cannot bear an interpretation that avoids the constitutional problem

Key Cases Cited

Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (two-step Suspension Clause framework and minimum requirements for habeas substitute)
INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001) (historical/finality-era analysis showing habeas review of legal error in immigration context)
Garcia de Rincon v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 539 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2008) ( § 1252(e) permits only limited habeas review of specified factual determinations)
Castro v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 835 F.3d 422 (3d Cir. 2016) (Third Circuit held petitioners could not invoke Suspension Clause based on their status; contrasted by this panel)
Osorio-Martinez v. Attorney General, 893 F.3d 153 (3d Cir. 2018) (Third Circuit later recognizing § 1252(e)(2) may fail to provide baseline habeas review in some applications)
Mezei v. Shaughnessy, 345 U.S. 206 (1953) (historical discussion of exclusion, due process, and habeas availability)