Vig v. Swenson, 2017 ND 285

Plaintiff Mary Ann Vig, personal representative of Junietta Swenson’s estate, sued her brother Willis (defendant) after Junietta executed a July 5, 2012 quitclaim deed conveying her Noonan home to Willis and after Willis subleased Junietta’s farmland to a third party (Mahlum).
Junietta had been admitted to a nursing home in March 2012; a temporary guardianship/conservatorship was in place from March–June 2012 and a permanent guardianship was appointed July 12, 2012 (one week after the July 5 deed).
Criminal and guardianship proceedings arose from family disputes and transactions around the same time; Willis had earlier reconveyed the home (May 25, 2012) as a bond condition but a later deed (July 5, 2012) was recorded after Junietta’s death.
The Estate alleged Junietta lacked capacity when she signed the July 5 deed and that Willis converted rent and grain proceeds from subleases because his leases with Junietta purportedly exceeded the 10-year statutory limit for agricultural leases.
The district court found Junietta competent to execute the July 5 deed (relying in part on a July 3, 2012 social-worker competency report and an April 2013 video) and held Willis’s leases and subleases were legally valid and not converted.
The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding the district court’s factual findings on capacity and conversion were not clearly erroneous and that the lessor’s life-estate limited the lease terms so they did not violate the ten-year statute.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Capacity to execute July 5, 2012 quitclaim deed	Junietta lacked testamentary/capacitative capacity at signing (temporary/permanent guardianship context)	Junietta was competent; evidence (social-worker report, video) supports capacity	Court affirmed: Estate failed to prove incapacity; finding not clearly erroneous
Whether July 5 deed is void for lack of legal standard/application	Court misapplied law and relied improperly on intent	Court applied proper standard and weighed evidence under burden of proof	Court affirmed: proper standard applied and rationale discernible
Validity of 2008 and 2011 agricultural leases (statutory 10-year limit)	Leases exceed 10 years and are void under N.D.C.C. § 47-16-02, entitling Estate to withheld rents/grain proceeds	Leases limited by lessor’s life estate and did not specify fixed terms beyond the life interest; not void; conversion claim fails because Junietta consented	Court held leases valid because by operation of law they are limited to the lessor’s life estate; conversion claim rejected
Whether issue of statute § 47-16-02 was tried by consent	Issue not pled; prohibits raising it on appeal	Evidence and trial testimony (without objection) put § 47-16-02 before the court	Court held the applicability of § 47-16-02 was tried by consent and is properly considered on appeal

Estate of Wenzel-Mosset v. Nickels, 575 N.W.2d 425 (1998) (burden on challenger to prove grantor lacked capacity to understand transaction)
Runge v. Moore, 196 N.W.2d 87 (1972) (articulation of test for capacity to execute a deed)
Anderson v. Blixt, 72 N.W.2d 799 (1955) (requirements for invalidating agricultural lease under statutory term limits)
Anderson v. Lyons, 845 N.W.2d 1 (2014) (lease terms may be valid when contingencies can limit duration to within statutory limits)
Paxton v. Wiebe, 584 N.W.2d 72 (1998) (conversion requires intent to exercise control inconsistent with owner’s rights)