View Co. v. Town of Monument, 2020 CO 52

The Town of Monument purchased Lot 6 in Forest View Estates IV, a subdivision whose lots are subject to a restrictive covenant limiting use to single‑family residences, and planned to build a municipal water storage tank there.
Because the covenant prohibited nonresidential structures, the Town sought to perfect title and extinguish the covenant via condemnation proceedings.
Forest View Company, Raymond Decker, and other lot owners intervened, claiming the covenant was a compensable property interest and seeking just compensation for diminution in their property values if Lot 6 were freed from the restriction.
The district court read Smith v. Clifton Sanitation District narrowly and held the covenant created a compensable interest; the Colorado Court of Appeals reversed, holding Smith broadly bars compensation to noncondemned covenant holders.
The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed the court of appeals, reaffirming Smith and holding that a restrictive covenant of this type is not a compensable property interest when a government uses condemned land inconsistently with the covenant.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Scope of Smith v. Clifton Sanitation Dist.	Smith was fact‑specific (a last‑minute scheme to thwart condemnation) and should be confined to its facts.	Smith announces a general rule that restrictive covenants cannot be the basis for compensation when a condemnor uses land for public purposes.	Smith is not limited to its facts; the court reaffirmed Smith as a broad rule.
Whether restrictive covenants are compensable property interests under Colo. Const. art. II, § 15	Restrictive covenants are equitable servitudes/easements—property interests that, if extinguished by condemnation, require just compensation.	Covenants cannot restrict eminent domain; eliminating a covenant on condemned land does not create a compensable interest in other owners.	A restrictive covenant of this type is not a compensable property interest in eminent domain when the government uses the condemned land inconsistently with the covenant.
Whether intervenors’ claims fit recognized takings/damage categories	Damage from lifting the covenant (diminution in value) is cognizable under the Constitution, including for nonadjacent owners.	There is no physical occupation; regulatory‑taking standards are not met; the damage clause is limited to adjacent‑land improvements.	Intervenors did not state a physical taking, regulatory taking, or qualifying damage claim under existing precedent; diminution in value alone is insufficient here.

Smith v. Clifton Sanitation District, 300 P.2d 548 (Colo. 1956) (holds restrictive covenants do not create compensable claims when a condemnor uses acquired land for public purposes inconsistent with the covenant)
Animas Valley Sand & Gravel, Inc. v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 38 P.3d 59 (Colo. 2001) (describes categories of takings/damage claims under article II, § 15)
City of Northglenn v. Grynberg, 846 P.2d 175 (Colo. 1993) (defines physical takings and tests for deprivation of use and enjoyment)
Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Flickinger, 687 P.2d 975 (Colo. 1984) (discusses fairness in burdening particular landowners vs. public)
Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo. v. Van Wyk, 27 P.3d 377 (Colo. 2001) (explains the limited scope of the constitutional "damage" clause to adjacent improvements)
Troiano v. Colo. Dep’t of Highways, 463 P.2d 448 (Colo. 1969) (applies Colorado’s rule allowing recovery for damages caused by public improvements to abutting owners)
Leigh v. Vill. of Los Lunas, 108 P.3d 525 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004) (represents the contrary, majority view that restrictive covenants are compensable property interests)