Vidmar v. Idaho Power Company
1:19-cv-00475
D. IdahoMar 24, 2021Background
- Vidmar worked >20 years as an engineer for Idaho Power Company (IPC) and was terminated in January 2019 following an October 2018 field incident at Hells Canyon.
- At issue: Vidmar used a corded electric drill while standing in water during installation of a stream gage; two coworkers witnessed the event and safety concerns were raised.
- IPC conducted an internal safety review and hired external investigator Pamela Howland, who concluded Vidmar violated IPC core values of safety, integrity (dishonesty in the investigation), and respect (bullying/unprofessional conduct); IPC relied substantially on her report when terminating Vidmar.
- Vidmar contends he suffers memory problems/a neurocognitive disorder, reported worsening memory to IPC personnel in late 2018, sought medical attention, and later (May 2020) was evaluated by neuropsychologist Dr. Craig Beaver who diagnosed an unspecified neurocognitive disorder and opined memory deficits could explain investigational inconsistencies.
- IPC argues Vidmar was not disabled, IPC lacked notice of any disability, contemporaneous medical records did not show cognitive impairment, and the termination was for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons; IPC moved for summary judgment on all claims.
- The court granted summary judgment for IPC on all claims (ADA, IHRA, FMLA, negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress), dismissing the First Amended Complaint with prejudice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| FMLA claim | Vidmar initially alleged FMLA violations | IPC moved to dismiss | Vidmar conceded; FMLA claim dismissed with prejudice |
| Whether Vidmar was "disabled" under the ADA/IHRA | Vidmar says memory/brain function deficits (supported by Dr. Beaver and family testimony) substantially limited major life activities like memory, concentration, working | IPC says contemporaneous medical records show normal cognition, Dr. Beaver’s exam was 16 months post-termination and unreliable for the termination date | Fact issue exists on disability, but summary judgment granted for IPC because Vidmar failed to prove termination was pretext for disability discrimination |
| Whether IPC had duty to engage in interactive process / accommodation | Vidmar argues IPC knew or should have known of his memory problems and thus had duty to investigate and accommodate | IPC argues Vidmar never requested accommodation, testified he could perform job without employer accommodation, and his reports of forgetting were insufficiently obvious to trigger employer duty | Court held Vidmar failed to raise a genuine dispute that IPC had notice or duty to initiate interactive process; claim fails as a matter of law |
| Whether IPC’s stated reasons for termination were pretextual | Vidmar contends investigational findings that he lied were actually manifestations of memory impairment and investigator ignored evidence | IPC proffers legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons: safety violation (drill in water), integrity concerns (dishonesty/inconsistent statements), and disrespect/bullying | Court found IPC offered honest, nondiscriminatory reasons and Vidmar did not produce sufficient evidence of pretext; ADA/IHRA claims dismissed |
| Emotional distress (negligent/intentional) | Vidmar ties distress claims to IPC’s alleged statutory violations and conduct | IPC argues emotional distress claims rely on underlying ADA/FMLA claims and fail if those claims fail; also no independent breached duty shown | Court dismissed emotional distress claims with prejudice because no underlying legal duty was established (ADA/FMLA claims failed) |
| Request for attorney’s fees | IPC sought to brief entitlement to fees, calling suit meritless | IPC invoked ADA fee-shifting standards | Court declined to find the suit frivolous on present record and treated fee briefing as unnecessary/moot; did not award fees |
Key Cases Cited
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (court may grant summary judgment to dispose of factually unsupported claims)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (summary judgment requires no genuine dispute of material fact)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (burden-shifting framework for discrimination claims)
- Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634 (application of McDonnell Douglas in ADA context)
- Allen v. Pacific Bell, 348 F.3d 1113 (elements of prima facie ADA discrimination claim)
- Chuang v. University of California Davis, 225 F.3d 1115 (plaintiff's burden to show pretext under McDonnell Douglas)
- Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054 (employer need only honestly believe its proffered reason to avoid finding pretext)
- Brady v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 531 F.3d 127 (employer notice/employee request rule and exception where employer should know of disability)
- Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (standard for awarding attorney’s fees to prevailing defendant)
- Edmondson v. Shearer Lumber Prods., 75 P.3d 733 (Idaho law on intentional infliction of emotional distress requires wrongful conduct)
- Frogley v. Meridian Joint School Dist. No. 2, 314 P.3d 613 (Idaho law requires breach of legal duty for negligent infliction of emotional distress)
