Victorick, David Lee v. State, PD-0031-15

Background

David Lee Victorick was indicted under Tex. Penal Code § 33.021(c) for knowingly soliciting by text a 15‑year‑old (K.E.) to meet him with intent to engage in sexual contact; he was tried, convicted by jury, and sentenced to five years.
Large volumes of prior sexually explicit texts between Victorick and K.E. were introduced; § 33.021(b) had been declared unconstitutional, so only solicitation-to-meet (subsection (c)) remained at issue.
At a pretrial stage the trial judge signed preprinted “Ancillary Conditions of Bond” that repeatedly referred to K.E. as the “victim”; Victorick argued this showed the judge prejudged guilt and sought recusal.
Victorick also filed a pretrial habeas claim arguing certain onerous bond conditions amounted to punishment triggering double jeopardy. The trial court denied the habeas relief.
On appeal the Ninth Court of Appeals affirmed both (1) denial of pretrial habeas relief and (2) the conviction, holding the evidence was legally sufficient to support solicitation and that the record did not show the judge deprived Victorick of a neutral tribunal or that the recusal rules were unconstitutional as applied.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Victorick)	Defendant's Argument (State / Court)	Held
Sufficiency of evidence to prove solicitation to meet with intent for sexual contact	Texts did not solicit K.E. to "meet"; offensive messages alone do not prove solicitation or intent; phone contents could have been sent by others	Messages, surrounding facts, and inferences (passworded phone, repeated conduct, context at party) allowed a rational jury to infer Victorick sent a solicitous text and intended sexual contact	Affirmed conviction: evidence legally sufficient under Jackson/Brooks standard
Judge impartiality / recusal based on pretrial bond order calling K.E. the "victim"	Use of the term "victim" in preprinted bond orders and allowing prosecutor to call K.E. a victim prejudged guilt and denied a neutral, impartial magistrate; mandatory recusal required	The form contained no factual findings; order was not shown to jury; trial court instructed to treat "victim" references as "alleged victim"; record does not show actual prejudgment	Denial of impartial-trial claim affirmed; no demonstration of disqualifying bias
Double Jeopardy: bond conditions amounted to punishment precluding subsequent prosecution	Onerous bond conditions (no contact with minors, no internet, distance restrictions, etc.) were punitive and thus constituted punishment for double jeopardy purposes	Pretrial conditions serve remedial/community‑safety purposes under arts. 17.15/17.40; no evidence presented that conditions were punitive in fact; proper remedy is motion to reduce bail or habeas — claim failed	Denied: bond conditions not shown to be punitive; habeas relief properly denied
Constitutionality of Rule 18a (recusal procedure / interlocutory review)	Rule 18a(a)(3) and 18a(j)(1)(A) unconstitutionally prevent immediate review where judge’s bias is evident in written orders, forcing trial before biased judge	Challenging party bears burden to show unconstitutionality as‑applied; Victorick failed to prove the judge prejudged guilt; Rule 18a not shown unconstitutional as applied	Denied: no as‑applied constitutional violation shown; recusal rules upheld in this record

Key Cases Cited

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (U.S. 1979) (standard for legal‑sufficiency review—whether any rational trier of fact could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt)
Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (framework for reviewing sufficiency of evidence and deference to jury credibility/inference drawing)
Ex parte Lo, 424 S.W.3d 10 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (holding § 33.021(b) unconstitutional; relevant to scope of evidence admissible/charged offense)
Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (U.S. 1927) (principle that adjudicator must be impartial to satisfy due process)
In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (U.S. 1955) (fair trial requires absence of prejudgment by the decisionmaker)