901 F.3d 172
3d Cir.2018Background
- Plaintiffs (Gerace and Vooys) bought a St. Croix bar and sued defendants in Superior Court of the Virgin Islands in 2005; they moved off-island in 2012 while the suit was pending.
- Defendants invoked V.I. Code §547 to require nonresident plaintiffs to post security bonds; Superior Court ordered bond payment in April 2013 and dismissed the action in April 2015 after plaintiffs failed to post bond.
- The Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands reversed in August 2016, reinstating plaintiffs’ contract claims and holding the nonresident-bond statute unconstitutional under the Privileges and Immunities Clause.
- Defendants petitioned this Court for certiorari; after initial briefing and oral argument, this Court granted initial en banc review to decide whether H.R. 6116’s effective-date language deprived the Third Circuit of certiorari jurisdiction over appeals filed on or after December 28, 2012.
- The Third Circuit (en banc majority) overruled its prior panel decision in Bason, held that H.R. 6116 applies to appellate cases (i.e., certiorari petitions) filed on or after the statute’s effective date, and dismissed the certiorari petition for lack of jurisdiction because this petition was filed after December 28, 2012.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether "cases commenced on or after" in H.R. 6116 refers to (a) trial-court filing dates or (b) appellate/ certiorari filing dates | H.R. 6116 should be read to preserve Third Circuit review for suits filed in Superior Court before Dec. 28, 2012 (i.e., case commencement at trial) | "Cases commenced" should be read as the commencement of the appellate case — the certiorari petition — so appeals filed on/after Dec. 28, 2012 fall to the U.S. Supreme Court | Held that "cases commenced" targets appellate cases; certiorari petitions filed on/after Dec. 28, 2012 are outside Third Circuit jurisdiction; petition dismissed for lack of jurisdiction |
| Proper interpretive approach when statute is silent on "commenced" (text v. function/purpose) | Bason-style ordinary-meaning textualism: "case" ordinarily begins at trial filing | Focus on statutory purpose and context (analogous to Slack): when statute addresses appellate review, the relevant commencement is at the appellate stage | Held that purpose/context control here; Supreme Court precedent (Slack) supports treating an appeal as the relevant "case" for appellate-directed statutes |
| Whether absence of a savings clause means pending certiorari petitions filed after enactment are barred | Plaintiffs: fairness/expectations justify retaining jurisdiction over pre-enactment trial cases | Defendants: Congress declined to use appellate-specific language, so general "cases" should mean trial-level commencement; absent savings clause, statute applies as written | Held that H.R. 6116’s effective-date phrase applies to petitions for certiorari filed on or after enactment; Congress’ chosen language governs and limits Third Circuit jurisdiction |
| Precedential weight of Bason and whether en banc reconsideration is appropriate | Rely on Bason precedent to retain jurisdiction | Urged reconsideration in light of Slack and statutory purpose | En banc majority overruled Bason on the effective-date interpretation (allowed by Rule 35 en banc process); dissent would have adhered to Bason |
Key Cases Cited
- Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473 (2000) (when a statute directed to appeals uses "commenced," the relevant case is the appellate case)
- Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997) (AEDPA applied to cases filed after its effective date)
- Bruner v. United States, 343 U.S. 112 (1952) (repeal of jurisdictional statute requires dismissal of actions if Congress provides no reservation for pending cases)
- Santos v. Guam, 436 F.3d 1051 (9th Cir. 2006) (interpreting repeal of certiorari jurisdiction over Guam appeals; pending appeals extinguished absent reservation)
- United Indus. Serv. v. Gov’t of the Virgin Islands (Bason), 767 F.3d 193 (3d Cir. 2014) (prior panel decision interpreting H.R. 6116 to mean trial-court commencement; overruled en banc)
- Fahie v. Virgin Islands, 858 F.3d 162 (3d Cir. 2017) (panel followed Bason; recognized the jurisdictional question)
- Kendall v. Daily News Pub. Co., 716 F.3d 82 (3d Cir. 2013) (discussion of the Third Circuit’s historical role and statutory framework for Virgin Islands review)
- Banks v. Int’l Rental & Leasing Corp., 680 F.3d 296 (3d Cir. 2012) (example of certifying questions to the V.I. Supreme Court and deference to its local-law expertise)