Victor Villanueva v. State of Florida
200 So. 3d 47
| Fla. | 2016Background
- Villanueva was charged with lewd and lascivious molestation of his 12‑year‑old daughter; a jury acquitted him of that charge but convicted him of the lesser included misdemeanor battery.
- The trial court sentenced him to jail and one year probation and imposed as a special probation condition participation in "MDSO therapy" (mentally disordered sex offender therapy).
- The probation order labeled the therapy a special condition (not a statutorily mandated standard condition under section 948.30), and the trial judge justified it by reference to the sexual nature of the touching.
- The Third District upheld the special condition, reasoning that section 948.30 does not prohibit imposing sex‑offender therapy as a discretionary special condition for non‑enumerated offenses and that the condition satisfied the Biller reasonableness test based on the record facts.
- Villanueva sought review on conflict grounds with the Fifth District’s decision in Arias, which held that sex‑offender conditions in section 948.30 may not be imposed for non‑enumerated offenses even as special conditions.
- The Florida Supreme Court resolved the conflict: it held section 948.30 does not bar imposing those conditions as discretionary special conditions, but the specific MDSO condition imposed on Villanueva was invalid under Biller.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether section 948.30 forbids imposing sex‑offender therapy as a special condition for non‑enumerated offenses | Villanueva: section 948.30 limits sex‑offender conditions to enumerated offenses; they cannot be imposed for non‑enumerated convictions | State/Third District: section 948.30 prescribes mandatory conditions only for enumerated offenses but does not prohibit courts from imposing same conditions as special discretionary conditions under §§ 948.03/948.039 | Held: Section 948.30 is ambiguous on exclusivity; read in pari materia with §§ 948.03 and 948.039, it does not bar imposing those conditions as special discretionary conditions for non‑enumerated offenses (Arias disapproved) |
| Whether the MDSO therapy condition imposed here satisfies Biller v. State (reasonableness of special probation conditions) | Villanueva: the jury convicted only of misdemeanor battery, not a sex offense; MDSO therapy is not reasonably related to the conviction, involves non‑criminal conduct, and is not shown to prevent future criminality | State/Third District: court may look to record facts (not just the conviction) and therapy was rationally related because the touching proved at trial was sexual in nature | Held: The MDSO therapy condition is invalid under Biller — it did not relate to the misdemeanor battery conviction, concerned non‑criminal conduct absent the condition, and there was no evidence of future sexual propensity; remand to modify probation |
| Whether Arias (Fifth DCA) is controlling | Villanueva: Arias prohibits imposing section 948.30 conditions for non‑enumerated offenses even as special conditions | State/Third District: Arias misread Sturges and extends the statute beyond its text; trial courts retain discretion | Held: Arias is disapproved to the extent it bars discretionary imposition of those conditions; but Villanueva still prevails on Biller grounds |
Key Cases Cited
- Biller v. State, 618 So.2d 734 (Fla. 1993) (test for validity of special probation conditions requiring at least one of three relationships to conviction, criminal conduct, or future criminality)
- Villanueva v. State, 118 So.3d 999 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (district court decision upholding MDSO condition; quashed on Biller grounds)
- Arias v. State, 65 So.3d 104 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011) (held sex‑offender conditions in § 948.30 cannot be applied to non‑enumerated offenses even as special conditions; disapproved)
- Sturges v. State, 980 So.2d 1108 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) (interpreted § 948.30 as prohibiting mandatory application for non‑enumerated crimes but recognized trial court discretion to impose reasonably related special conditions)
- Rodriguez v. State, 378 So.2d 7 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979) (adopted the three‑part framework later affirmed in Biller)