Victor v. County of Suffolk
150 A.D.3d 928
| N.Y. App. Div. | 2017Background
- Plaintiff Harold Victor sued County of Suffolk under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law claims after criminal charges and prosecution arising from a citizen's accusation.
- He alleged malicious prosecution and a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial caused by county/DA office conduct, including alleged failure to train/supervise ADAs.
- County moved, in effect, under CPLR 3211(a)(7) to dismiss the complaint insofar as asserted against it.
- Supreme Court granted the County's motion and dismissed the § 1983 malicious prosecution claim against the County, and dismissed the § 1983 speedy-trial claim as to the County.
- Victor appealed the dismissal; the Appellate Division reviewed whether the complaint stated § 1983 claims against the County for malicious prosecution and for deprivation of the right to a speedy trial based on policies/failure to train.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether County is liable under § 1983 for malicious prosecution | Victor argued County could be liable for misconduct leading to malicious prosecution | County argued arrest was supported by probable cause from a citizen accusation, so no § 1983 malicious prosecution claim | Dismissed: complaint pleads facts showing arrest was supported by probable cause; malicious prosecution claim against County properly dismissed |
| Whether exculpatory evidence negated probable cause | Victor argued later-disclosed exculpatory evidence destroyed probable cause | County argued complaint did not allege facts showing post-arrest evidence vitiated probable cause | Rejected Victor: complaint lacks facts showing exculpatory evidence eviscerated probable cause |
| Whether County can be liable under § 1983 for speedy-trial violations attributable to the DA's office | Victor alleged failure to train/supervise ADAs and deliberate indifference causing speedy-trial violations | County argued it cannot be held liable for DA office conduct | Held for Victor on this issue: complaint sufficiently alleges County liability via failure-to-train/supervise theory and the DA acted as a county policymaker; dismissal of the speedy-trial § 1983 claim was improper |
| Standard for denying a CPLR 3211(a)(7) motion on § 1983 training/supervision claim | N/A (legal standard) | County relied on thresholds for municipal liability under Monell/Canton | Court applied Canton/Monell principles and found alleged deliberate indifference adequate at pleading stage |
Key Cases Cited
- Rivera v. County of Nassau, 83 A.D.3d 1032 (2d Dep't 2011) (probable cause from citizen accusation defeats malicious prosecution claim)
- Carlton v. Nassau County Police Dept., 306 A.D.2d 365 (2d Dep't 2003) (same principle on probable cause from complaint by known citizen)
- Johnson v. Kings County Dist. Attorney's Office, 308 A.D.2d 278 (2d Dep't 2003) (county may be liable for DA office actions where training/supervision of ADAs is at issue)
- Ramos v. City of New York, 285 A.D.2d 284 (1st Dep't 2001) (municipal liability for conduct of DA's office when DA acts as policymaker)
- Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) (municipal failure-to-train liability requires deliberate indifference)