949 F.3d 443
9th Cir.2020Background
- 2012 class action by Arizona prisoners challenged ADC’s delivery of health care; parties settled in a Stipulation requiring compliance with 103 Performance Measures across ten complexes and a multi-step enforcement process (notice, meet-and-confer, mediation, motion to enforce).
- In Oct. 2017 the district court issued an Order to Show Cause directing immediate compliance with 11 specified Performance Measures for all class members and ordered reporting; defendants later failed to meet the court’s benchmarks.
- On June 22, 2018 the district court entered a Contempt Order imposing $1,000 per instance for Performance Measures that fell below the 85% substantial-compliance threshold, totaling $1,445,000, and entered judgment; the court also awarded plaintiffs attorneys’ fees, partially denied termination of monitoring, ordered reinstallation of HNR (Health Needs Request) boxes, and appointed Rule 706 experts.
- Defendants appealed the contempt and a suite of enforcement orders; plaintiffs cross-appealed the attorneys’ fees award. The Ninth Circuit consolidated and resolved those appeals.
- The Ninth Circuit affirmed the contempt, affirmed the termination and HNR-Box orders, vacated and remanded the attorneys’ fees award for recalculation (rate, excluded hours, and reweighing of any multiplier), and dismissed appeals of several expert-related orders for lack of jurisdiction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Power to hold defendants in contempt for violating the court’s Order to Show Cause | Court was authorized to enforce the Stipulation and issue injunctive orders; contempt may follow noncompliance with the court’s order | Stipulation is a private contract and cannot be the basis for contempt; Order to Show Cause was void | Court had authority: contempt rested on violation of the court’s Order to Show Cause (an enforceable injunction), so contempt power was proper and affirmed |
| Civil v. criminal nature of contempt (due process) | Sanctions are coercive/compensatory to compel compliance and remedy class injuries (civil) | Sanctions were punitive (criminal), so higher procedural protections required | Sanctions were primarily coercive and compensatory (civil); no criminal-due-process protections required |
| Adequacy of findings supporting $1,000-per-violation sanction | Plaintiffs: district court provided reasoned explanation tying sanctions to harm and coercion | Defendants: insufficient findings; remand required under Shuffler | District court adequately considered harm and effectiveness; findings were sufficiently detailed; no remand |
| Whether contempt/order improperly imposed 100% compliance (changed Stipulation) | Remedy enforces compliance once measure falls below 85% trigger; does not change the definition of substantial compliance | District court improperly required 100% compliance and altered Stipulation | Any error in language about 100% compliance did not affect contempt because sanctions targeted measures below the 85% trigger; no reversal |
| Scope of recoverable attorneys’ fees under Paragraph 43 (post‑Stipulation enforcement work) | Fees recoverable for enforcement activities beyond formal motions because the Stipulation’s enforcement process includes pre-motion work | Fees should be limited to time spent on formal motions to enforce | District court correctly awarded fees for post‑Stipulation enforcement work (broad enforcement activities recoverable) |
| Source and calculation of PLRA hourly cap (base CJA rate) | Plaintiffs: district court properly used Congressional Budget Summary to derive Judicial Conference rate; applied cap | Defendants: district court misidentified the Judicial Conference-established base rate (should use Guide or other figure) | Use the rate the Judicial Conference authorized/requested (as reflected in Congressional Budget Summary). District court erred using $146; remand to apply correct base (FY2017 base $137 → PLRA cap $205.50) and recalculate fees |
| Paralegal/local market rates and geographic market | Plaintiffs: may use non‑forum market rates where qualified local counsel unavailable; paralegal market may exceed PLRA cap so cap applies | Defendants: paralegal work rates should be Phoenix market ($125) and not the higher Bay Area/D.C. rates | Out‑of‑forum rates are permissible when local counsel unavailable; paralegal work in SF area may merit PLRA cap, but district used wrong cap figure—recalc and remand for paralegal fees |
| Fee enhancement (multiplier) | Plaintiffs sought enhancement for performance and case complexity | Defendants: Stipulation/PLRA preclude multiplier or multiplier inappropriate; district abused discretion | Multiplier may be permitted under PLRA, but district abused discretion by double‑counting Kerr factors; vacate enhancement and remand to reweigh without duplicative factors |
| HNR‑Box reinstatement and burden of proof | Plaintiffs: discontinuing HNR boxes undermined compliance measurement; reinstatement was a proper remedial injunction | Defendants: Stipulation doesn’t mandate HNR boxes; plaintiffs bear burden to prove noncompliance; court exceeded authority | District court could order HNR boxes (injunctive remedy consistent with Stipulation); placing burden on defendants was error but harmless given unchallenged factual findings; HNR order affirmed |
| Appeals from expert‑related orders (appointing Rule 706 experts; plans) | Plaintiffs: expert appointments and processes are interlocutory implementation steps | Defendants: challenge appointments and scope now | Ninth Circuit lacks jurisdiction over non‑final expert and plan‑submission orders under §1291 and collateral‑order doctrine; those parts of the appeal dismissed |
Key Cases Cited
- Stone v. City & County of San Francisco, 968 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1992) (contempt requires violation of a specific and definite court order)
- Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265 (U.S. 1990) (federal courts have inherent power to enforce lawful orders by contempt)
- Int’l Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821 (U.S. 1994) (analysis for determining whether contempt is civil or criminal)
- Shell Offshore Inc. v. Greenpeace, Inc., 815 F.3d 623 (9th Cir. 2016) (coercive civil contempt may employ conditional fines; fines payable to court or opposing party is relevant)
- Shuffler v. Heritage Bank, 720 F.2d 1141 (9th Cir. 1983) (civil contempt fines require reasoned consideration of harm and effectiveness)
- Parsons v. Ryan, 912 F.3d 486 (9th Cir. 2018) (earlier panel decision in this litigation interpreting the Stipulation and upholding related remedies)
- Perez v. Cate, 632 F.3d 553 (9th Cir. 2011) (PLRA/§3006A rate inquiry looks to the Judicial Conference authorization/request reflected in Congressional budget materials)
- Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826 (U.S. 2011) (lodestar and appellate deference; fee shifting to achieve "rough justice")
- Kelly v. Wengler, 822 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2016) (PLRA framework and availability of enhancements under statutory scheme)